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AGENCY PRAGMATISM IN ADDRESSING LAW’S FAILURE: 
THE CURIOUS CASE OF FEDERAL “DEEMED APPROVALS”
OF TRIBAL-STATE GAMING COMPACTS
Kevin K. Washburn*
ABSTRACT
In the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA), Congress imposed a 
decision-forcing mechanism on the Secretary of the Interior related to tribal-state 
compacts for Indian gaming. Congress authorized the Secretary to review such 
compacts and approve or disapprove each compact within forty-five days of 
submission. Under an unusual provision of law, however, if the Secretary fails to 
act within forty-five days, the compact is “deemed approved” by operation of law 
but only to the extent that it is lawful. In a curious development, this regime has 
been used in a different manner than Congress intended. Since the United States 
Supreme Court held part of IGRA unconstitutional in 1996, the Secretary 
declined to issue an affirmative approval or disapproval on more than seventy-five
occasions—thus, allowing a compact to become approved by operation of law—but 
has simultaneously issued a letter setting forth legal objections to aspects of the 
compact. The Secretary’s creative response to a broken regulatory scheme appears to 
be unique, and it raises interesting questions about how the executive branch 
should behave in the face of legal uncertainty. It raises questions of administrative 
law, such as whether the Secretary’s non-action is reviewable as agency action 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), whether the Secretary’s letter is 
entitled to deference, and if so, what level of deference. It also raises important 
questions about whether such action constitutes good policy. This Article examines 
some of those questions.
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INTRODUCTION
In the vast history of federal Indian affairs policy, which predates
the United States Constitution,1 Indian gaming is a relatively new 
phenomenon. The Supreme Court firmly resolved the legality of 
Indian gaming in a 1987 decision, California v. Cabazon Band of Mis-
sion Indians, and then codified in law in the 100th Congress’s en-
actment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA).
1. Arguably, the first federal Indian policy was the Proclamation of 1763, which, 
though characterized as one of King George’s Intolerable Acts in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, became the blueprint for federal American Indian policy. Indeed, laws with strik-
ingly similar provisions to the Proclamation were enacted in the first Congress ever con-
vened. See Robert N. Clinton, The Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of 
Federal-State Conflict over the Management of Indian Affairs, 69 B.U. L. REV. 329 (1989).
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For nearly the entire 200-plus year history of federal-tribal rela-
tions, tribes have complained about the failure of the United States 
to meet its treaty and trust responsibility through fiscal appropria-
tions for Indian country programs. During the past thirty years, 
however, Indian gaming has been part of the solution to this prob-
lem. Indian gaming has become exceedingly important to Indian 
country. 
When President Reagan and the 100th Congress enacted IGRA 
“to protect [Indian] gaming as a means of generating tribal reve-
nue”2 and to “promote tribal economic development, tribal self-
sufficiency, and strong tribal government[s],”3 they could not have 
imagined how well it would succeed. Comparing Indian gaming 
revenues to federal Indian country appropriations makes this 
plain. In Fiscal Year 2016, Congress and the Obama administration 
appropriated $2.8 billion for Indian Affairs at the Department of 
the Interior (the Department or Interior)4 and more than $5 bil-
lion for Indian Health Service programs. Taken together, the BIA 
and IHS programs constitute the core of federal treaty and trust 
responsibilities to tribes. Tribes and Indian people also earned 
roughly $1 billion in royalties from natural resources produced on 
approximately 60 million acres of land owned in trust by the feder-
al government.5
Though all of these revenue sources are important to tribes, 
they pale in comparison to Indian gaming revenues. Gaming tribes 
earned a total of $31.2 billion in gross gaming revenue in Fiscal 
Year 2016.6 In sum, gaming tribes today collectively earn more than 
2. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(3) (2012).
3. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701(4) & 2702(1) (2012).
4. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS AND PERFORMANCE 
INFORMATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 IA-ES-2 (2018). This source, commonly known as the 
Green Book, is the President’s appropriation request to Congress and contains historical 
data for actual appropriations for past years. It is prepared by the Department of the Interi-
or and the Office of Management and Budget in conjunction with other White House staff.
5. Tribes and Indian people earned $853 million in royalties from mineral leases for 
oil, gas and coal on their federal lands in FY 2015, the latest year for which data could be 
found. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS AND PERFORMANCE 
INFORMATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 154 (2017) (the President’s request to Congress for 
funding for FY 2017). Royalties were almost certainly lower in 2016 because the price of 
crude oil declined markedly from 2014 to early 2016. U.S. ENERGY INFO. AGENCY, With Low 
Oil Prices in 2016, Federal Revenues from Energy on Federal Lands Again Declined, (Jan. 24, 2017), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=29652; Clifford Krauss, Oil Prices: What to 
Make of the Volatility, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2017/business/energy-environment/oil-prices.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=
2C677243D28B52C8AC434E49BCBAAFFD&gwt=pay.
6. Press Release, Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, 2016 Indian Gaming Revenues In-
creased 4.4% (July 12, 2017).
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thirty times the revenue that tribes earn from natural resources, 
ten times more than they receive from the Department of the Inte-
rior Indian Affairs program, and several multiples of the amount 
provided to tribes and Native American people through Indian 
Health Services appropriations. As discussed below, a not insignifi-
cant amount of that top-line number gaming revenue figure is paid 
to states under revenue-sharing agreements, so Indian gaming also 
supports state government programs.7
Put simply, the importance of gaming as an economic engine in 
Indian country cannot be overstated. Though not all tribes engage 
in gaming, for many of those that do, gaming revenues represent a 
very significant source of funding for tribal government programs. 
Perhaps because of the magnitude of gaming revenues, Indian 
gaming has produced unusual behavior at one of the agencies that 
has responsibility for oversight of Indian gaming. This Article is 
about that unusual behavior. 
During congressional debate on the legislation that became 
IGRA, states sought a regulatory role in Indian gaming. States as-
serted that gaming attracted organized crime and that they needed 
authority to regulate Indian gaming to prevent crime and other 
evils associated with it. In the final version of the bill, Congress 
gave interested states an opportunity to address those concerns. In 
IGRA, Congress provided that Class III casino-style gaming may not 
be lawfully offered by an Indian tribe unless the tribe negotiates a 
“tribal state compact” with the state in which the gaming operation 
is located.8 However, Congress also provided that a state would not 
be allowed to hold Indian gaming hostage by refusing to negotiate. 
If the state refused to negotiate in good faith, the tribe could sue 
in federal court.9
The compact requirement ultimately gave interested states the 
ability to negotiate the role that they wish to play in the regulation 
of Indian gaming. Congress was concerned about states overreach-
ing in compact negotiations, however, so it assigned the Secretary 
of the Interior the responsibility of reviewing gaming compacts en-
tered between Indian tribes and states.10
Secretarial review, though important, introduced a new problem 
of potential bureaucratic delay, which has plagued Indian affairs 
7. See generally Steven Andrew Light; Kathryn R. L. Rand; Alan P. Meister, Spreading the 
Wealth: Indian Gaming and Revenue-Sharing Agreements, 80 N.D. L. REV. 657 (2004).
8. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (2012).
9. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(3)(A) & 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) (2012).
10. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(B) (2012).
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since the beginning of the Republic.11 To prevent delay in the Sec-
retary’s review, Congress provided a strict time limit of only forty-
five days. Under IGRA, if the Secretary fails to act within forty-five 
days, a compact is deemed to be approved, but only to the extent 
that it is consistent with IGRA.12
Congress presumably intended the provision to be a decision-
forcing mechanism that prevents important or controversial deci-
sions from languishing. If the Secretary fails to act in a timely way, 
the issue resolves itself; approval occurs automatically, by operation 
of law. By attaching a short fuse, the forty-five-day provision forces 
the Secretary to act within a very short period of time or allows the 
parties to proceed if the Secretary fails to act.13 As a practical mat-
ter, the provision has generally achieved its intended effect of set-
tling the matter of compact validity within forty-five days of submis-
sion. 
Following enactment of IGRA, the Secretary appeared to have 
three options when reviewing a compact: approval, disapproval, or 
no action. Presumably, Congress intended the no-action option to 
be exercised when the Secretary lacked the time or resources to 
make a decision on short notice. The process proceeded as Con-
gress intended through the early 1990s following IGRA’s enact-
ment in 1988.
In 1996, the context changed dramatically when the Supreme
Court found part of IGRA unconstitutional in Seminole Tribe v. Flor-
ida.14 In Seminole Tribe, the court overruled previous precedent15
and held that the state had Eleventh Amendment immunity, which 
11. Backlogs at the Department of the Interior: Land into Trust Applications; Environmental 
Impact Statements; Probate; Appraisals and Lease Approvals, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, 110th Cong. 100-224 (2007) (statement of Hon. Byron L. Dorgan, Chairman of 
Comm. on Indian Affairs and U.S. Sen. of North Dakota) (stating “delays at the Department 
of the Interior in performing its duties have dramatically slowed the growth and the devel-
opment of tribal communities and their economies”); see also The Indian Tribal Energy and 
Self-Determination Act Amendments of 2011, Hearing on S. 1684 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Af-
fairs, 112th Cong. 112-636 (2012) (testimony of Hon. James M. Olguin, Vice Chairman of 
Southern Ute Indian Tribal Council) (noting “bureaucratic delays in federal approval of 
Indian mineral leases and drilling permits”).
12. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(C) (2012) (“If the Secretary does not approve or disap-
prove a compact described in subparagraph (A) before the date that is 45 days after the date 
on which the compact is submitted to the Secretary for approval, the compact shall be con-
sidered to have been approved by the Secretary, but only to the extent the compact is con-
sistent with the provisions of this chapter.”).
13. Technically, the compact does not take effect until notice of the approved or 
“deemed approved” compact is published by the Secretary in the Federal Register. Since this 
is a ministerial act, however, publication tends to occur promptly.
14. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
15. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
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Congress lacked the power to abrogate.16 The effect of the decision 
was to deprive tribes of their right to force states to negotiate in 
good faith. Suddenly, tribes had no way to bring states to the nego-
tiation table.
In response to the Supreme Court decision, something unex-
pected happened. In 1997, then-Secretary Bruce Babbitt received a
compact for approval that gave him serious concerns that a state 
had taken advantage of a tribe. Babbitt declined to either approve 
or disapprove the compact, allowing the compact to become 
“deemed approved” by operation of the law. But, he sent a short 
letter to the parties explaining his views and identifying the terms 
in the compact that he believed were illegal. In the letter, Babbitt
criticized the significant gaming revenue the tribe would pay to the 
state, as well as a large regulatory fee paid to the state.17
Secretary Babbitt’s letter effectively created a fourth compact 
decision option, which Congress likely had not envisioned when it 
enacted IGRA. In addition to the existing options of approval, dis-
approval, or a “no action deemed approval,”18 an additional option 
existed: a “no action deemed approval with the Agency’s views ex-
pressed.”
Babbitt’s action was unprecedented.19 It was the first time, in at 
least 161 compact approvals since 1990,20 that a Secretary had de-
16. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. at 76.
17. Letter from Bruce Babbitt, U.S. Sec’y of the Interior, to Wendell Chino, President 
of the Mescalero Apache Tribe (Aug. 23, 1997).
18. At least one court has referred to the no-action option as a “no-action approval.” It 
involved a case in which there was no accompanying letter. Amador County v. Salazar, 640 
F.3d 373, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
19. Deemed approval letters had been sent at least twice during the George H.W. Bush 
Administration and once previously during the Clinton Administration, but the letters were 
perfunctory. The first instance, in 1991, was one of the first compacts ever submitted. In this 
letter, the Department expressed concerns about payments to a state government, but it 
took the Department more than ninety days to issue the letter, suggesting that the letter was 
not the result of a deliberate strategy to avoid a formal approval or disapproval decision. See
Letter from Assistant Sec’y Eddie F. Brown, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to Chairman Russell 
Hawkins, Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribal Council (Nov. 26, 1991). In the second instance, in 
1992, the deemed approval appears to have occurred because the Department had noted a 
troublesome provision in the review process and the parties amended the compact to ad-
dress that provision. But the Department, curiously, did not restart the time clock following 
the amendment and concluded that the compact had been deemed approved. See Letter 
from Acting Assistant Sec’y Richard Whitesell, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to Chief Keith 
Davenport, Sac and Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa (April 20, 1992); Letter from Eddie 
F. Brown to Russell Hawkins, supra. In the third prior instance, which was issued roughly 
sixty days after receipt of the compact, it appears that the Department was merely late. The 
Department did not indicate that it had any concerns about the compact, but the forty-five 
days had already run, meaning that the compact had been deemed approved by operation 
of law. Letter from Assistant Sec’y Ada Deer, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to Chairman Stanley 
G. Jones, Sr., Tulalip Tribes of Wash. (Dec. 7, 1993).
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clined to make an affirmative decision yet issued what might be 
called a “quasi-decisional” letter that explained in-depth the Agen-
cy’s concerns. It was a clever but unexpected use of IGRA’s provi-
sion that allows compacts to go into effect without formal action by 
the Secretary. It is likely that Congress did not contemplate this 
turn of events, just as it likely did not anticipate the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Seminole Tribe that an important part of IGRA 
was unconstitutional. 
Since Secretary Babbitt’s original “deemed approval” letter, at 
least sixty other compacts have been “deemed approved,” many 
with a “views letter” from an Interior official.21 Babbitt was acting as 
a member of the Clinton administration, but such letters have 
since been issued by officials of both Republican and Democratic
presidential administrations, including the Trump Administra-
tion.22 In the Department of the Interior and the gaming industry, 
these letters are now routinely called “deemed approved letters” or 
“deemed approval letters.”
The deemed approval letter is a curious development. It is not 
forbidden by IGRA but was likely not contemplated either. It is a 
creative solution by the agency to circumstances that Congress like-
ly did not anticipate when it enacted IGRA. The practice has raised 
a host of legal and policy questions. First, is this type of agency be-
havior legitimate? Is its use consistent with the purposes of IGRA? 
Second, how should parties, courts, arbitration forums, and the 
public regard the content of the deemed approval letters? Does a 
deemed approval constitute agency action for purposes of adminis-
trative law? What level of scrutiny or deference should adjudicative 
bodies apply to the views expressed in a deemed approval letter? 
Third, how should deemed approvals be viewed from a policy per-
spective? Does the Secretary deserve credit for transparency in 
formally providing views in a letter following a deemed approval, 
or should the Secretary be condemned for avoiding difficult deci-
sions? A deemed approval creates some legal uncertainty because 
the compact is considered approved only to the extent it is lawful. 
In other words, the approval does not extend to illegal provisions. 
But those provisions tend not to be self-identifying. Does a deemed 
20. See discussion supra note 19.
21. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-743T, INDIAN GAMING Preliminary 
Observations on the Regulation and Oversight of Indian Gaming 8 (2014).
22. Letter from Gavin Clarkson, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Policy and Economic Develop-
ment—Indian Affairs, U.S. Department of the Interior to the Honorable Joseph Talachy, 
Governor, Pueblo of Pojoaque (Oct. 23, 2017).
56 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 52:1
approved letter increase or decrease the uncertainty caused by the 
fact of the deemed approval itself? 
The purpose of this Article is to explore this unusual agency ac-
tion in hopes of shedding light on the issue for courts, policy mak-
ers, parties to compacts, and others who must make sense of 
deemed approvals. Part I explains the development of the deemed 
approval provision and the deemed approval letter. Part II ad-
dresses the status of such letters under administrative law and sug-
gests how courts and arbitration panels ought to interpret them. 
Part III explores the normative questions surrounding this kind of 
agency behavior—does it reflect good policymaking?
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
DEEMED APPROVAL PROVISION AND LETTER
The legislative history is devoid of guidance about the specific 
reasons for the deemed approval provision.23 When Congress en-
acted IGRA in 1988, however, it was well aware of the frequent 
problems caused by delay in decision-making processes in Indian 
affairs at the Department of the Interior. Congressional drafters 
likely understood the need for a forty-five-day time limit to force 
resolution of the issue. Indeed, several other statutory and regula-
tory provisions in Indian affairs mirror the deemed approval provi-
sion in IGRA.24
A. The Need for the Deemed Approval Provision
It is well known that decisions related to Indian affairs can lan-
guish at the Department of the Interior for a number of reasons. 
One reason might be characterized as “benign neglect.” Staff
members are stretched thin and may lack adequate time or re-
sources to devote to the work of carefully reviewing a file and pre-
paring a decision memorandum for the Secretary. In the absence 
23. The legislative history notes the provision but does not provide much explanation. 
S. REP. NO. 100-446, at 19 (1988).
24. For example, because of agency delay in signing tribal self-determination contracts, 
Congress provided that such contracts would be deemed approved if the Secretary did not 
reject them within a certain period of time. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(2) (2012); 25 C.F.R. 
§ 900.18 (2018). For a practical explanation of how the process works, see Yurok Tribe v. 
Dep’t of the Interior, 785 F.3d 1405 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that the dismissal for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted was proper because the Tribe had not yet 
been awarded a contract).
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of a deadline, staff must focus on urgent matters or those matters 
that do have a deadline. Both the Department of the Interior and 
its principal Indian agency, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA),
have been notorious for slow decision making on matters affecting 
Indian tribes.25 Indian tribes and their business partners have com-
plained for decades about the time it takes to obtain a decision 
from the Department.26 IGRA was enacted against a backdrop of 
more than a century of administrative inefficiency.27
A second reason that decisions might languish in Indian gaming 
is because of their political difficulty. Gaming decisions are often 
controversial.28 At the time IGRA was enacted, gaming in general 
was still highly controversial. Ordinary commercial casinos existed 
only in a few limited locations in the United States. As Congress 
knew well from hearings and lobbying around the passage of 
IGRA, significant hostility to Indian gaming existed in some quar-
ters, and some had a desire to prevent its expansion. Opposition 
ranged from law enforcement officials concerned about organized 
crime29 to competitors in Nevada, New Jersey, and other gaming 
industries30 to those who held moral opposition to any form of 
gambling. Opposition has since come to include environmentalists 
opposed to large-scale gaming developments and neighbors with a 
not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) view toward new gaming develop-
ments.31 For all of these reasons, a decision maker at Interior may 
25. See, e.g., Yair Listokin, Confronting the Barriers to Native American Homeownership on 
Tribal Lands, the Case of the Navajo Partnership for Housing, 33 URB. LAW. 433, 466 (2001) (dis-
cussing BIA delays in approving homesite leases).
26. Addressing the Housing Crisis in Indian Country: Levering Resources and Coordinating Ef-
forts: Hearing before S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 17 (2012) 
(statement of Sen. Tim Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Af-
fairs) (“I have heard numerous horror stories related to the delays in approving leases over 
the years.”).
27. References to BIA administrative inefficiency abound in governmental reports. See 
generally Robert McCarthy, The Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Federal Trust Obligation to Ameri-
can Indians, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 5–8 (2004).
28. See generally STEVEN A. LIGHT & KATHRYN R.L. RAND, INDIAN GAMING AND TRIBAL 
SOVEREIGNTY: THE CASINO COMPROMISE (2005) (exploring history, law, and politics related 
to Indian gaming).
29. Establish Federal Standards and Regulations for the Conduct of Gaming Activities Within 
Indian Country: Hearing on S. 902 before S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 99th Cong. 47 (1986) (tes-
timony of Victoria Toensing, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States) (explaining 
that gaming involves large sums of cash and draws peripheral service industries that are like-
ly to attract organized crime and other criminal elements).
30. See, e.g., Franklin Ducheneux, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Background and Leg-
islative History, 42 ARIZ ST. L.J. 99, 129 (2010) (describing opposition from California card 
rooms, charity bingo operations, and horse tracks).
31. See Jon Marcus, Why Casinos are Becoming Like Landfills, TIME (Dec. 23, 2013), 
http://nation.time.com/2013/12/23/why-casinos-are-becoming-like-landfills/.
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wish to avoid or delay the political ramifications of a gaming deci-
sion. 
By requiring a quick decision or an automatic approval, Con-
gress could prevent any of these groups from pressuring the Secre-
tary to withhold compact approvals and thereby delay the gaming 
development that might depend on compact approval. Thus, the 
forty-five-day time limit and the deemed approved provision par-
tially depoliticized the decision-making process, making life some-
what easier for the Secretary.32 Although lobbying by parties in fa-
vor of or opposed to a gaming compact nevertheless occurs, the 
forty-five-day clock means that it never lasts more than forty-five 
days after the compact is submitted. And, if the lobbying produces 
indecision or political gridlock, the compact is still approved au-
tomatically. 
Given how controversial gaming was thirty years ago when IGRA 
was enacted, the forty-five-day clock may have been necessary to 
achieve the Congressional purposes of IGRA, such as promoting 
tribal economic development and self-sufficiency.33 Indeed, the 
forty-five-day clock likely reflected Congress’s and the Reagan Ad-
ministration’s commitment to prevent obstruction and ensure that 
future Secretaries of the Interior would not be able to stop or delay 
Indian gaming, even surreptitiously, through bureaucratic delay. 
To block a compact, an Interior Secretary would need to act quick-
ly and decisively. 
A third reason that Indian gaming decisions languish might be 
characterized as “malign neglect.” To the chagrin of some tribes, 
tribal lands also tend to be federal lands, so federal officials have 
significant control over those lands and economic transactions on 
them. The Secretary has not always exercised his power to approve 
economic transactions involving tribes in the best interest of tribes. 
Indeed, it has sometimes been used to harm tribes and undermine 
32. Today, the reasons that gaming decisions can languish is even more politically nu-
anced. Hostility to new gaming establishments often includes other tribes with existing casi-
nos who would prefer to avoid additional competition. A tribal leader with an existing casi-
no in such circumstances can argue that new competition will have a negative effect on the 
gaming tribe’s community, usually because it interferes with their monopolistic or oligopo-
listic market power. Because most Indian communities, even those with casinos, face diffi-
cult economic challenges and poverty, these arguments can be compelling. Frequently, the 
tribe with an existing casino will suggest that the United States has a trust responsibility to 
the tribe with the existing casino too and should not make a decision that will harm that 
tribe. See, e.g., Thomas Clouse, Kalispel Tribe Files Federal Lawsuit to Halt Spokane Tribe’s Casino,
SPOKESMAN REV. (Apr. 18, 2017), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2017/apr/18/
kalispel-tribe-files-federal-suit-to-halt-spokane-/.
33. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(3) (2012).
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their negotiating power. For example, when the Navajo Nation 
sought to set an increased royalty rate for coal mining with the 
Peabody Coal Company in the 1980s, the Secretary used the final 
approval power as a lever to prevent the tribe from raising the roy-
alty rate.34 The United States had negotiated a two percent royalty 
rate decades earlier.35 Consistent with market rates, the Navajo Na-
tion, under a new law that authorized the tribe to set the rate for 
future coal mining, sought to raise the rate to twenty percent.36
The Navajo Nation was required to obtain approval from a local 
BIA official and successfully obtained that approval.37 The coal 
company appealed the decision, however, and the Navajo Nation 
received the old two percent rate until the appeal was decided.38
While the appeal was pending before Department officials, the 
coal company lobbied the Secretary.39 To cause delay, the Secretary 
instructed a staffer to tell the tribe that a decision on the appeal 
would not be forthcoming anytime soon. Because the Navajo Na-
tion only earned the two percent rate until the issue was resolved,
the delay placed enormous pressure on the Navajo Nation, ulti-
mately forcing the tribe to negotiate a settlement with Peabody.40
To resolve the issue and obtain higher royalties, the Navajo Nation 
ultimately agreed to a much lower royalty rate of 12.5 percent,
which was then the absolute federal minimum for such rates.41
These events unfolded from 1984 to 1987, just prior to and during 
Congress’s consideration of various Indian gaming bills that even-
tually produced IGRA in 1988. 
When the Peabody Coal issue came to light, it was exceedingly 
embarrassing to the federal government,42 but it revealed an activi-
ty that could occur in any context in which a tribe negotiated a
business deal requiring Secretarial approval. The ensuing litigation 
made the public—and several outraged federal judges—aware of 
that which tribal officials had long known: Political actors within 
the Department of the Interior could use delay as a tactic to bene-
fit others at tribal expense. Accordingly, tribes since have tended to 
34. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2002).
35. Id. at 495.
36. Id. at 496.
37. Id. at 497.




42. Barry Meier, Navajo Lawsuits Contend U.S. Government Failed the Tribe in Mining Royal-
ty Deals, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/18/us/navajo-
lawsuits-contend-us-government-failed-the-tribe-in-mining-royalty-deals.html.
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oppose laws that give the Secretary unfettered discretion on ap-
proval of tribal economic decisions.
In sum, though the legislative history is thin, the justification for 
the forty-five-day approval provision is fairly obvious in light of the 
larger context. In IGRA, Congress included several other time lim-
its for action by federal decision-makers,43 likely for similar reasons. 
B. Seminole Tribe v. Florida and the Need for an Administrative 
Solution to an Unconstitutional Law
The compact requirement itself was an innovation and was de-
signed to address a sensitive political issue. When IGRA was enact-
ed, it provided that a tribe could conduct Class I traditional gam-
ing free of any outside regulation and could conduct Class II 
games, such as bingo and pull-tabs, subject to tribal and federal 
regulation. A tribe could offer full casino-style gaming, which IGRA 
designated as Class III gaming, however, only as long as it was lo-
cated in a state that allowed at least some person or entity to en-
gage in such gaming for some purpose, even if it was only a church 
or charitable organization.44 This provision, at least in part, codi-
fied the legal theory accepted by the Supreme Court in California v. 
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,45 which held that a tribe had a sov-
ereign right to offer its own regulated gaming in a state that regu-
lated, but did not absolutely prohibit, gaming. States, however, had 
raised significant law enforcement concerns about Indian gaming; 
in particular, they asserted that Indian casinos might be infiltrated 
by organized crime.46 Since any such activity on Indian lands would 
also necessarily occur within state lines, Congress was somewhat 
sympathetic to the states’ legitimate law enforcement concerns. 
Congress addressed these concerns by prohibiting a tribe from en-
43. Congress included a specific deadline of ninety days for the National Indian Gam-
ing Commission (NIGC) Chairman’s approval of tribal gaming ordinances, which includes a 
deemed approval provision, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(e) (2012), and 180 days for the NIGC Chair-
man’s approval of Indian gaming management contracts, which lacks a deemed approval 
provision. 25 U.S.C. § 2711(d) (2012). Because of the hard deadline, tribal gaming ordi-
nances tend to be approved within 90 days, but management contracts tend to take years, in 
part because the process is so complicated, requiring parties to amend their submissions 
multiple times before approval and each amendment is treated as restarting the 180-day 
clock. See generally Kevin K. Washburn, The Mechanics of Indian Gaming Management Contract 
Approval, 8 GAMING L. REV. 333 (2004).
44. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (2012).
45. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
46. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Hearing Before the Committee on Interior and Insular Af-
fairs, 100th Cong. 256 (1987) (statement of National Association of Attorneys General).
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gaging in gaming unless it had first negotiated a compact with the 
state in which the tribe was located. The compact would give the 
state the opportunity to address legitimate state regulatory con-
cerns by defining a clear regulatory role for the state in Indian 
gaming.47
Congress was concerned, however, that states might usurp tribal 
sovereignty.48 The compact requirement was potentially subject to 
abuse because a state that wished to prevent the development of 
Indian gaming operations might simply refuse to negotiate a com-
pact. Congress addressed this concern explicitly. To prevent the 
state from using the compact requirement to prevent Indian gam-
ing from developing, Congress required states to negotiate in good 
faith with a tribe toward an agreed gaming compact.49 Congress al-
so explicitly identified the limited subjects that may be negotiated 
in a gaming compact.50 If a state failed to negotiate in good faith 
toward a compact with a tribe, Congress authorized the tribe to sue 
the state in federal court.51
After IGRA’s enactment in 1988, the scheme initially seemed to 
work. Within a year, Minnesota had negotiated and signed com-
pacts with several tribes, and several other states had undertaken 
negotiations.52 In 1990 and 1991, more than two dozen compacts 
between tribes and various states were signed and approved by the 
Secretary.53 From 1990 to 1997, the Secretary approved more than 
160 compacts. 
Simultaneously, however, a problem was brewing in litigation 
between the Seminole Tribe and the State of Florida. Florida offi-
cials had fought Indian gaming since the 1970s54 and were not in-
47. S. REP. NO. 100-446, at 13 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 1988 WL 
169811 (“[a] State’s governmental interests with respect to Class III gaming on Indian lands 
include the interplay of such gaming with the State’s public policy, safety, law and other in-
terests . . . .”).
48. Id. at 6 (“Further, it is the Committee’s intention that to the extent tribal govern-
ments elect to relinquish rights in a tribal-State compact that they might have otherwise re-
served, the relinquishment of such rights shall be specific to the tribe so making the elec-
tion, and shall not be construed to extend to other tribes, or as a general abrogation of 
other reserved rights or of tribal sovereignty.”).
49. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A) (2012) (creating a federal cause of action for a state’s
failure to negotiate with a tribe or a state’s failure to negotiate in good faith).
50. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(3)(C)(i)–(vii) (2012).
51. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(7)(A)(i)–(iii) (2012); id. §§ 2710(d)(7)(B)(i)–(ii).
52. Tribal-State Gaming Compacts Approval, 55 Fed Reg. 12292, 12292 (Apr. 2, 1990).
53. Indian Gaming Compacts, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.indianaffairs.gov/
as-ia/oig/gaming-compacts (last visited Oct. 12, 2018).
54. See Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 313–16 (5th Cir. 1981) (affirming 
a district court’s grant of relief to the tribe, concluding that the State of Florida did not pro-
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clined to give up just because the Supreme Court and Congress 
had recognized an Indian tribe’s right to conduct gaming. The 
State of Florida refused to negotiate with the Seminole Tribe as re-
quired by IGRA. 
In September 1991, the Seminole Tribe sued the State of Florida 
in federal court—a right granted to the tribe under IGRA—for the 
state’s failure to negotiate in good faith.55 Florida responded that 
IGRA was unconstitutional because it violated the state’s Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity. The case ultimately reached the 
Supreme Court in 1995. When it was decided in 1996, the Court 
held that the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution precluded 
Congress from subjecting a state to suit by a tribe. Accordingly, the 
Court held unconstitutional the provision of IGRA that allowed 
tribes to sue states for failing to negotiate in good faith toward a 
gaming compact.
Seminole Tribe wrecked the scheme devised by Congress to bal-
ance the regulatory interests of states against the right of tribes to 
engage in gaming. Following the decision, an Indian tribe still had 
the theoretical right to conduct gaming, but it nevertheless needed 
a tribal-state gaming compact to do so lawfully, and it suddenly had 
no leverage to force a state to come to the table to negotiate a gam-
ing compact. 
Having lost the “stick” of an IGRA-authorized lawsuit for failure 
to negotiate in good faith, tribes still needed some way to bring 
states to the negotiating table. Accordingly, tribes were forced 
more and more to offer “carrots” in the form of shares of gaming 
revenues.56 For example, compacts entered between tribes and the 
State of Minnesota in 1990 and the State of Wisconsin in 1993 had 
no state revenue sharing provisions. In 1998 and 1999, Wisconsin
demanded and received revenue sharing payments after its com-
pacts expired.57
hibit bingo games as against public policy and the state’s civil statute regulating bingo could 
not be enforced on tribal sovereign land), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982).
55. Seminole Tribe of v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 51–52 (1996).
56. See Eric S. Lent, Note, Are States Beating the House? The Validity of Tribal-State Revenue 
Sharing Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 91 GEO. L.J. 451, 453, 455–56 (2003) (“Tribes 
now find themselves largely at the mercy of the states, which, for all practical purposes, can 
refuse to negotiate compacts or demand revenue sharing from tribes as a quid pro quo for 
the tribal-state compact necessary to operate Class III gaming activities.”).
57. Id. at 558; cf. Lower Sioux Indian Community Tribal-State Compact, 56 Fed. Reg. 
192 (Oct. 3, 1991) (Minnesota’s compacts did not expire and, accordingly, Minnesota’s trib-
al state compacts still lack revenue-sharing provisions).
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Although the offer to share significant gaming revenue brought 
states to the table, it created an entirely new issue.58 To Congress, 
Indian gaming was intended to benefit tribes, not states; the com-
pacting requirement was designed to ensure that parties addressed
legitimate state regulatory issues related to gaming. To President 
Ronald Reagan, who signed IGRA into law, the purpose of IGRA 
was to help tribes become more self-sufficient and independent
from the federal government.59 President Ronald Reagan took of-
fice in 1981 and announced his administration’s Indian policy in 
1983.60 One of President Reagan’s central goals in Indian policy 
was to foster tribal self-sufficiency. It soon became apparent that 
gaming was the most effective economic engine to achieve that ob-
jective. As a result, Reagan’s Department of the Interior officials 
were very supportive of tribes in developing Indian bingo opera-
tions. The Reagan Administration is credited with encouraging In-
dian gaming throughout the 1980s until its legality was firmly re-
solved in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Cabazon Band.61
Congress carefully designed the compact process to discourage 
any notion that states could take tribal gaming revenues. A range 
of provisions in IGRA makes plain that Congress intended gaming 
58. See Gatsby Contreras, Exclusivity Agreements in Tribal-State Compacts: Mutual Benefit 
Revenue-Sharing or Illegal State Taxation?, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 487, 495 (2002) (raising 
concern that some revenue-sharing provisions are possibly contrary to federal policy); see 
also Courtney J. A. DaCosta, When “Turnabout” Is Not “Fair Play”: Tribal Immunity Under the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 97 GEO. L.J. 515, 543 (2009) (“Revenue-sharing arrangements 
have proven highly controversial . . . .”); Henry Buffalo & Robert Miller, Commentary, 
Spreading the Wealth: Indian Gaming and Revenue-Sharing Agreements, 80 N.D. L. REV. 681, 689 
(2004) (“[And irrespective of what the Ninth Circuit has said, I still believe that the law pro-
hibits revenue sharing agreements.”).
59. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2012).
60. President Ronald Reagan, Statement on Indian Policy, (Jan. 24, 1983), http://
files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED226884.pdf.
61. See, e.g., Nicholas S. Goldin, Note, Casting a New Light on Tribal Casino Gaming, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 798, 812–13 (1999). When California state authorities instigated litigation 
challenging the right of a tribe to engage in gaming in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission 
Indians, the state eagerly sought the support of the federal Department of Justice in the liti-
gation. Law enforcement officials at the Department of Justice, who had fought organized 
crime in the (non-Indian) gaming industry for decades, were very sympathetic to Califor-
nia’s opposition to Indian gaming. State law enforcement officials assumed that President 
Reagan would be sympathetic, as well, since he was a former governor of California. When 
the case reached Solicitor General Charles Fried’s office in 1987, however, Fried refused to 
intervene in the Supreme Court case. Fried later quipped that if the United States had for-
mally asserted that Indian gaming was illegal, the first arrest would have been the Secretary 
of the Interior because Reagan’s Interior Department and BIA were Indian gaming’s biggest 
champions. Kevin K. Washburn, Conflict and Culture: Federal Implementation of IGRA by the Na-
tional Indian Gaming Commission, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Department of Justice, 42 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 303, 311–312 (2010) (recounting the story of why Solicitor General Charles 
Fried declined to file a brief in Cabazon).
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to be an economic development vehicle only for tribes. These pro-
visions gave life to the Reagan Administration’s hope that gaming 
would be a path to tribal self-sufficiency. IGRA requires, for exam-
ple, that tribes retain the “sole proprietary interest” in the gaming 
operation.62 While a few provisions in IGRA address the use of trib-
al gaming revenues by states, they tend to explicitly narrow that 
use. For example, Congress authorized tribes to pay states to defray 
the legitimate costs of regulating Indian gaming under a com-
pact.63 Congress expressly disclaimed any notion that it was author-
izing states to impose any “tax, fee, charge or other assessment” on 
Indian gaming revenues.64 In IGRA, Congress clearly did not con-
template any general state revenue sharing. It assumed that a tribe 
could sue a state for failure to negotiate in good faith if a state 
made such demands.
From a federal Indian policy perspective, the substantive prob-
lem is that revenue sharing with states could undermine the prom-
ise of IGRA in furthering tribal economic development. Indian 
gaming might become more of a boon for state governments than 
for tribal governments. 
Nevertheless, because of Seminole Tribe, revenue sharing provi-
sions in compacts began to proliferate.65 Just a few years earlier, 
states had opposed Indian gaming on the ground that tribes might 
be “shaken down” by organized crime. Suddenly, states also wanted 
to shake down tribes and take their revenues. It was a new and un-
expected development that frustrated Indian tribes and caused 
discomfort for the Department of the Interior in its nominal role 
as federal trustee for tribes.66
Seminole Tribe placed the Department in a very difficult political 
position. The Department has a general federal trust responsibility
to protect the interests of Indian tribes, and it was this trust re-
sponsibility that justified federal review of compacts between tribes 
and states.67 If the Department approved a compact with state rev-
62. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(A) (2012).
63. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(iii).
64. Id. § 2710(d)(4).
65. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Bringing Balance to Indian Gaming, 44 HARV. J. LEG. 39, 42 
(2007) (“[I]n order to alleviate the negative impact of Seminole Tribe on Indian gaming[,] 
Indian tribes and the states began to negotiate broader revenue sharing agreements . . . .”).
66. See Steven Andrew Light et al., Spreading the Wealth: Indian Gaming and Revenue-
Sharing Agreements, 80 N.D. L. REV. 657, 659 (2004) (asserting that “revenue sharing is politi-
cal coercion at tribes’ expense”).
67. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indian Gaming and Cooperative Federalism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
253, 277 (2010) (noting that the role of the Secretary under the compact approval provi-
sions in IGRA is one of “trustee”).
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enue sharing provisions, it would be complicit in undermining the 
basic purpose of IGRA and would be lending the Executive 
Branch’s authority to the idea that state revenue sharing was legal.
On the other hand, if the Department disapproved a tribal-state 
gaming compact because the compact (illegally) provided for state 
revenue sharing, there was a very real question about whether the 
tribe would be able to entice the state back to the table for further 
compact negotiations. Since a compact is required for Class III 
gaming, the risk was that the tribe would not be able to conduct 
Class III gaming. Such an outcome would have undermined IGRA 
and the policy goals of Congress and the Reagan Administration in 
supporting Indian gaming. 
It was this conundrum that Secretary Bruce Babbitt faced when 
the New Mexico gaming compacts reached his desk in 1997.
C. New Mexico Gaming Compact Controversy
By 1995, a year before the Court announced its ruling in Semi-
nole Tribe, several tribes had signed compacts with the State of New 
Mexico in 1995.68 These compacts included modest state revenue 
sharing provisions, allowing the state to take less than five percent 
of the tribe’s gaming revenues in exchange for allowing tribes sub-
stantial exclusivity in offering gaming within the state.69 In other 
words, the revenue sharing was a modest quid pro quo to the state 
for maintaining an effective ban on casino gaming by commercial 
vendors within the state, and the Department accepted it on that 
basis.70
After the Department approved the 1995 compacts, however,
the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the New Mexico gover-
nor lacked authority to bind the state to those gaming compacts 
absent legislative approval.71 After the state Supreme Court’s deci-
sion, litigation determined that those compacts, though approved 
by the Department, had no force or effect because the Governor’s 
signature was ultra vires.72
68. Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546, 1550 (1997).
69. See generally W. DALE MASON, INDIAN GAMING: TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND AMERICAN 
POLITICS 70–145 (2000).
70. See, e.g., Letter from Ada E. Deer, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to Gov-
ernor Tony B. Vigil, Pueblo of Nambe 1 (Apr. 24, 1995) (approving a tribal state gaming 
compact).
71. State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11, 18 (N.M. 1995).
72. Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546, 1559 (10th Cir. 1997).
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The tribes in New Mexico found themselves re-negotiating com-
pacts with the state legislature. Now, though, they faced a negotiat-
ing context in which Seminole Tribe had undercut the tribes’ ability 
to sue states for failure to negotiate in good faith. In this new legal 
environment, tribes had dramatically different negotiation lever-
age.
Ultimately, twelve New Mexico tribes signed compacts with the 
state in 1997, but having lost their leverage in Seminole Tribe, the 
tribes agreed to pay up to up to sixteen percent of slot machine net 
win revenues to the state, as well as significant regulatory fees.73
At the Department, the sixteen percent revenue-sharing figure 
caused significant concern.74 Sixteen percent of “net win” from slot 
machines is quite significant because net win can be likened to 
gross income in any ordinary commercial enterprise. It is a top-line 
number from which all of the ordinary business costs of the opera-
tion must be paid, such as payroll, advertising, debt repayment on 
construction loans, and all operating expenses, to reach the bot-
tom line. In other words, the sixteen percent “off the top” might 
be far more than that which remains at the bottom line after pay-
ment of various costs. Giving such a large percentage of the gam-
ing revenue to the state creates a substantial risk, at least for some 
tribes, that the state might earn more from Indian gaming than the 
tribe earns. It also means that the state revenue is guaranteed, 
while the tribe bears significant financial risk. The concern at Inte-
rior was that this type of outcome was difficult to square with the 
Congressional purposes behind authorizing Indian gaming and 
might well constitute an illegal tax or fee by the state.75
Though the tribes signed the compacts, they signed under pro-
test and continued to argue that they signed under duress since 
Seminole Tribe had denied them the ability to force the state to ne-
gotiate in good faith. In other words, though the tribes signed the 
compacts, they presumably signed under protest because it appears 
73. Lent, supra note 56, at 459–60.
74. See Letter from Bruce Babbitt to Wendell Chino, supra note 17, at 1.
75. Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act on the hope that gaming 
would “promote tribal economic development [and] tribal self-sufficiency . . . .” 25 U.S.C. § 
2701(4) (2012); 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2012). It created a federal regulatory regime specifi-
cally to protect the industry “as a means of generating tribal revenue.” 25 U.S.C. § 2702(3). 
With one minor exception to allow a state government to recoup costs expended in regulat-
ing Indian gaming under a compact, Congress disclaimed any intention to let the compact-
ing requirement “be interpreted as conferring upon a State or any of its political subdivi-
sions authority to impose any tax, fee, charge, or other assessment . . . .” 25 U.S.C. 
§ 2710(d)(4) (2012).
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that they were simultaneously lobbying Secretary Babbitt not to 
approve.76
The Secretary was in a difficult spot. On one hand, if the Secre-
tary approved the compacts, he would vouch for the legality of the 
compacts and undermine the tribes’ claim that the compacts were 
unfair and illegal; this would call into doubt whether the Secretary 
was meeting his trust responsibility to tribes under IGRA. 
On the other hand, if the Secretary disapproved the compacts 
on the basis that they were unfair to the tribes, he would deprive
them of the opportunity to engage in lawful Class III Indian gam-
ing, essentially forcing the tribes to continue negotiating with the 
state even though the state was arguably negotiating in bad faith. 
Disapproval might punish tribes more than the state. 
Ultimately, after much hand-wringing, the Secretary allowed the 
compact to go into effect by taking no action during the forty-five-
day period. However, at the end of the forty-five-day period, Secre-
tary Babbitt sent a short two-and-a-half page letter outlining his 
concerns about the compacts. 
The Secretary’s letter expressed both procedural and substantive 
concerns. He noted that the compacts were not the product of true 
bilateral negotiations and asserted that the revenue sharing provi-
sions appeared to be more consistent with an inappropriate fee or 
tax assessment, rather than a “bargained-for payment for a valuable 
privilege.”77 After detailing problems with the provisions, the Secre-
tary concluded the letter by expressing hope that the careful ex-
planation would assist the parties in negotiations to resolve the 
Secretary’s concerns.
For a time, it was unclear whether the Secretary had taken the 
proper path. The Secretary’s action did not produce any sort of 
quick resolution. Litigation and lengthy negotiations between the 
tribes and the state ensued.78 However, because the compacts had 
taken effect by virtue of the Secretary’s no-action approval, the 
tribes legally could engage in gaming while they argued with the 
state about the legality of the revenue sharing provisions. The Sec-
retary’s creative action thus gave the tribes leverage and restored 
some of the balance lost after Seminole Tribe.
During the litigation, the tribes refused to pay the state revenue 
share and deposited the funds into escrow, where they accumulat-
76. See generally Fletcher, supra note 65, at 61 (discussing Secretary Babbitt’s letter).
77. See Letter from Bruce Babbitt to Wendell Chino, supra note 17, at 2.
78. Lent, supra note 56, at 459–61.
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ed to tens of millions of dollars.79 The parties eventually settled the 
litigation with the signing of new compacts. Eventually, most of the 
tribes signed new compacts in 2001 on substantially better revenue-
sharing terms. The new compacts provided for revenue sharing of 
up to eight percent of net win, half of the amount demanded in 
the 1997 compacts.80 The Department of the Interior affirmatively 
approved the new compacts in 2001.81
D. Deemed Approvals Since 1997
Since IGRA was enacted, the Department has reviewed compacts 
or compact amendments more than 780 times.82 Since the 1997 
deemed approval letter by Secretary Babbitt, the Department has 
approved more than 400 compacts. Of these approvals, the De-
partment has allowed compacts to become approved by operation 
of law more than seventy-five times.83 More than sixty of these no-
action approvals have been accompanied by letters. In some ways, 
the deemed approval letter has become a fairly common practice 
within the Department. For comparison, during the same time pe-
riod, the Department issued only ten disapprovals. 
But while the number sixty suggests that deemed approval let-
ters have become frequent, the facts are a more complicated. 
States tend to offer the same terms, or very similar terms, to various 
tribes. The number may overstate the frequency of deemed ap-
proval letters because states often sign the same or nearly identical 
compacts with numerous tribes. For example, within a couple of 
months of Secretary Babbitt’s 1997 letter to the Mescalero Apache 
Tribe, Secretary Babbitt issued nine other letters related to virtually 
identical compacts between New Mexico and other tribes.
79. Id. at 460.
80. See, e.g., Letter from Neil McCaleb, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Alvino 
Lucero, Governor, Isleta Pueblo 21 (Nov. 21, 2001).
81. See id. at 1.
82. Indian Gaming Compacts, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.indianaffairs.gov/as-
ia/oig/gaming-compacts (last visited Oct. 12, 2018) (list of Approved Tribal-State Class III 
Gaming Compacts). The first Compact was approved in 1990 between the Fort Mojave Indi-
an Tribe and the State of Nevada. Tribal-State Compacts Approval; Class III (casino) Gam-
bling: Ft. Mojave Tribe—Nevada, 55 Fed. Reg. 12292 (Apr. 2, 1990).
83. Many of these instances involved virtually identical compacts. A state may present 
the same compact terms to multiple tribes within the state.
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In total, deemed approval letters have been issued for approxi-
mately thirteen substantively different state compacts84 regarding 
tribal-state compacts in only eleven states: California, Iowa, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, 
South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin.85
Deemed approval letters have been issued under every presiden-
tial administration since 1997. For example, Secretary Gale Nor-
ton, a member of President George W. Bush’s cabinet, used a 
deemed approval letter in a no-action approval of a gaming com-
pact between the Seneca Nation and the State of New York in 
2002.86 Though she purported to use the no-action approval ap-
proach “reluctantly,” she wrote a detailed eight-page letter to iden-
tify a variety of concerns and to speak more generally about Indian 
gaming policy, concluding that “policy considerations . . . counsel 
against an affirmative approval.”87 Secretary Norton’s primary con-
cern was that the compact gave the Seneca Nation a region of geo-
graphic exclusivity at the expense of two other tribes.88 Curiously, 
she explicitly found that the provision did not constitute a legal vi-
olation of the federal trust responsibility to Indian tribes, but she 
raised a policy concern about the potential precedent the compact 
might set, saying, “I am still troubled that parties in future com-
pacts may pit tribe against tribe.”89 She also expressed concerns 
about so-called “off-reservation gaming,” concluding that “ele-
ments of this Compact may be used by future parties to proliferate 
off-reservation gaming development on lands . . . selected solely 
based on economic potential, wholly devoid of any other legitimate 
[tribal] connection.”90
Deemed approval letters were also issued in the Obama admin-
istration91 and the Trump administration.92
84. These include: California in 2012, Iowa in 1992, Massachusetts in 2014, Michigan in
2008, Michigan in 1999, Nevada in 2004, New Mexico in 2015, New Mexico in 1997, New 
York in 2002, Oklahoma in 2004, South Dakota in 1991, Washington in 1993, Wisconsin in
2003. See Indian Gaming Compacts, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.indianaffairs.gov/as-
ia/oig/gaming-compacts (last visited Oct. 12, 2018).
85. Id.
86. Letter from Gale Norton, Sec’y of the Interior, to Cyrus Schindler, President, Sene-
ca Nation of Indians 1 (Nov. 12, 2002).
87. Id. at 7.
88. Id. at 4.
89. Id. at 5.
90. Id. at 2.
91. See e.g., Letter from Larry Echo Hawk, Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep’t 
of the Interior, to Sherry Treppa Bridges, Chairperson, Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake 
(Aug. 31, 2011); Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs, U.S. 
Dep’t of the Interior, to Virgil Siow, Governor, Pueblo of Laguna (Oct. 16, 2015); Letter 
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The deemed approval letters have raised a variety of concerns, 
but the Department’s concern that appears most often in the let-
ters relates to revenue sharing with states. Concerns about revenue 
sharing appear in roughly fifty-eight of the deemed approval let-
ters.93 The letters reflect the general concern that state revenue 
sharing conflicts with federal policy in favor of gaming being a 
means to tribal economic development and self-sufficiency94 and 
requiring that “the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of the 
gaming operation.”95 In some instances, of course, a revenue share 
has been so high that it resulted in a disapproval.96
The second most common concern in the letters relates to ef-
forts to address matters in a compact that are not germane to gam-
ing,97 a concern raised in forty-three of the letters. IGRA generally 
authorizes tribes and states to include only those matters in com-
pacts that deal directly or at least indirectly with gaming licensure 
and regulation.98 The concern here is that states may be using the 
tribal state gaming compact requirement as a lever to require 
tribes to negotiate about matters that are not directly related to 
Class III gaming, such as water rights, hunting rights, fishing rights,
other treaty rights, or even Class II gaming.99 Such provisions are 
outside the limited scope of that which Congress intended states 
and tribes to negotiate in Indian gaming compacts. 
Another common concern raised in some letters are compact 
provisions related to so-called “free play” in connection with reve-
nue sharing. This issue involves the accounting treatment of pro-
motional “free play” that an Indian gaming casino provides to con-
sumers to encourage them to visit the casino. The question is 
whether such credits provided by the casino constitute revenue to 
from Lawrence S. Roberts, Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to 
Robert J. Welch, Jr., Chairman of the Viejas (Baron Long) Group, Capitan Grande Band of 
Mission Indians of the Viejas Reservation (Oct. 21, 2016).
92. Letter from Gavin Clarkson to Joseph Talachy, supra note 22.
93. See, e.g., Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs, Dep’t of 
the Interior, to Hon. Virgil Siow, Governor of the Pueblo of Laguna (Oct. 16, 2018), 
https://www.indianaffairs.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/oig/oig/pdf/idc1-033867.
pdf.
94. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701(4) (2012); id. § 2702(1).
95. Id. § 2702(2).
96. See Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs, Dep’t of the 
Interior, to Hon. Deval Patrick, Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Oct. 12, 
2012), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/oig/webteam/pdf/idc1-028222.
pdf.
97. See Kevin K. Washburn, Recurring Issues in Gaming Compact Approval, 20 GAMING L.
REV. & ECON. 388, 391–93 (2016).
98. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(3)(C)(i)–(vii) (2012).
99. See Washburn, supra note 97.
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the tribe when the credit is used and, thus, whether it should be 
counted as gaming revenues for purposes of state revenue-sharing
payments. To tribes, free play reflects a marketing cost, not a gain. 
Because tribes presumably use past gaming revenues to provide 
free play, tribes assert that they have already made revenue-sharing 
payments to the state on those revenues. The issue has come up, 
now and then, in disputes in several states.100 In a 2015 deemed ap-
proval letter, the Department of the Interior noted that New Mexi-
co’s demand was inconsistent with Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles and industry standards, concluding that revenue pay-
ments on free play would be an illegal state tax on Indian gaming 
revenues.101 A few other concerns have appeared in more than one 
letter.102
In sum, although Secretary Babbitt introduced the deemed ap-
proval letter in 1997 to address concerns primarily about revenue 
sharing with states, the Department has broadened the use of the 
letters over time to address a wider range of subjects. 
II. HOW SHOULD LAW AND THE COURTS TREAT NO-ACTION 
APPROVALS AND DEEMED APPROVAL LETTERS UNDER IGRA?
Since the Department has, over time, often used no-action ap-
provals and has broadened use of the deemed approval letter, it is 
inevitable that courts will eventually directly confront the legitima-
cy of these types of outcomes. When these issues reach the courts, 
how will they be decided under federal administrative law? How 
should courts view such behavior? What is the legal effect of a no-
action approval or a deemed approval letter? Are no-action ap-
100. See Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Granholm, 475 F.3d 805 (6th Cir. 
2007) (discussing how the issue arose in Michigan); see also Ryan Burns, Revenue Sharing and 
Free Play, INDIAN GAMING MAGAZINE, Apr. 2010, at 56, http://www.indiangaming.com/
istore/Apr10_Burns.pdf (citing the issue as arising in Connecticut, Oklahoma and New 
Mexico).
101. Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of the 
Interior, to Hon. Danny H. Breuninger Jr., Mescalero Apache Tribe (June 9, 2015). In 2017, 
the Department, then under new management, reaffirmed its position. Letter from Gavin
Clarkson to Joseph Talachy, supra note 22 (“Our position remains the same. Free play and 
point play must be treated according to industry standards and Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles (GAAP) by excluding both from the definition of ‘net win,’ which forms 
the basis for revenue sharing calculations.”).
102. Examples include Class II gaming regulations, impermissible regulations outside of 
the gaming context, ongoing related litigation, land use concerns, criminal jurisdiction is-
sues, and the expiration of the forty-five-day decision period. See Indian Gaming Compacts,
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.indianaffairs.gov/as-ia/oig/gaming-compacts (last vis-
ited Oct. 12, 2018), for such letters.
72 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 52:1
provals reviewable as agency action under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act? If such behavior is “action,” is it “final?” What kind of 
review is appropriate? Are deemed approval letters entitled to any 
deference or respect, and, if so, to what extent? 
This Part will analyze the uncertain application of the APA to
no-action approvals and deemed approval letters. It will also de-
scribe and critique the existing cases that have dealt with no-action 
approvals and the one case that discussed in dicta a deemed ap-
proval letter. Finally, it will recommend an approach to review of 
the question.
A. How Should the APA Apply to a No-Action Approval?
As noted above, no-action approvals are enigmatic. This is in 
part because it is not certain how or whether judicial review is 
available. An ordinary compact approval would be categorized ac-
cording to administrative law within the species of agency action 
known as “informal adjudication.” Under principles of federal ad-
ministrative law, of course, an agency action is generally subject to 
judicial review in the courts, at least as long as it is final for the 
agency.103 Ordinarily, a compact approval or disapproval by the 
Secretary would be a final agency action that could be reviewed by 
a federal court under the APA in a case properly filed by any party 
with standing.
In reviewing such an approval or disapproval, the court ordinari-
ly would examine the administrative record developed by the 
agency, including any submissions by the parties, and examine the 
reasoned decision of the agency to determine, for example, 
whether the agency acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or otherwise not 
in accordance with law.104 It is not uncommon, after the Depart-
ment has received a compact to review and while its decision is 
pending, for the Department to ask for more information, inviting 
the parties to brief matters for which the Department has con-
cerns. For example, the Department will frequently ask for a justi-
fication for any revenue sharing in the compact.105
In other words, a small administrative record is often developed 
in the compact approval process. In the ordinary case of an affirm-
103. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702 & 704 (2012).
104. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
105. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-355, INDIAN GAMING: REGULATION AND 
OVERSIGHT BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, STATES, AND TRIBES 17–19 (2015).
FALL 2018] Tribal-State Gaming Compacts 73
ative approval or disapproval, it is relatively routine work for a 
court to examine the administrative record, review the statute and 
the regulations, and review the stated basis for the Secretary’s deci-
sion.106 In such a context, the court can analyze, for example, 
whether the decision was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” in light of the ad-
ministrative record that had been developed and the reasoning of-
fered by the Department.107
Judicial review of agency action usually involves a review of the 
justification or reasoning for the action. Such actions are frequent-
ly called “record review” cases because the court is limited to re-
viewing the administrative record before the agency.108 The court 
will examine the entire administrative record and analyze whether 
the agency relied on the correct law, whether it applied the correct 
legal factors, and whether it properly weighed the various consid-
erations in reaching a decision.109
In such a case, the agency’s reasoning is exceedingly important 
to the court’s review. It is black letter law that, at least under the 
broadest form of review, a court may not substitute its own views 
for the views of the expert agency charged by Congress with mak-
ing the decision.110 Indeed, in contrast to a district court decision,
which an appellate court can often affirm even if it reached the 
right result for the wrong reasons, an appellate court must ordinar-
ily remand a decision to an agency under such circumstances.111
Because the reasoning underlying agency action is crucially im-
portant for judicial review, it is not obvious how courts should pro-
ceed in the face of a no-action approval. But the routine adminis-
trative law approach to judicial review does not fit well in the 
context of a no-action approval, because the agency “action” to be 
reviewed is really no action at all. A no-action approval is, by defini-
tion, not an action by the agency; it is inaction. A compact that is 
approved by the agency’s inaction within forty-five days becomes 
effective not because of any formal action by the agency, but be-
106. 25 C.F.R. §§ 293.1–293.16 (2009).
107. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
108. See Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 438 (2012) (“Under the APA, judicial review of an 
agency decision is typically limited to the administrative record.”).
109. See generally Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)
(discussing judicial review of agency action).
110. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 
(1983).
111. Sprint Nextel Corp. v. FCC, 508 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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cause Congress so provided.112 How should judicial review proceed 
under such circumstances?
A no-action approval thus presents a doctrinal puzzle for pur-
poses of judicial review, in part because the APA draws a distinc-
tion between agency action and agency inaction. Thoughtful 
scholars have made a compelling case that the APA’s distinction 
between action and inaction is superficial, artificial, simplistic, sub-
ject to manipulation, unduly confusing, and ultimately meaning-
less.113 Inaction is enigmatic in many instances because of the ques-
tions inherent in determining whether it is reviewable. For exam-
example, is the inaction “final” for purpose of the APA?114 Does it 
represent action “unlawfully withheld” or “unreasonably de-
layed?”115 When does inaction constitute an abuse of discretion?116
In the case of compact approval under IGRA, the statute itself 
provides conflicting implications. It contains language reflecting 
agency discretion in some places and language suggesting no dis-
cretion in others. For example, Congress authorized the Secretary 
to approve gaming compacts. Congress further provided that 
“[t]he Secretary may disapprove a [gaming compact] only if such 
compact violates - (i) any provision of this chapter, (ii) any other 
provision of Federal law that does not relate to jurisdiction over 
gaming on Indian lands, or (iii) the trust obligations of the United 
States to Indians.” Finally, “[i]f the Secretary does not approve or 
disapprove a [gaming compact] before the date that is forty-five
days after the date on which the compact is submitted to the Secre-
tary for approval, the compact shall be considered to have been 
approved by the Secretary, but only to the extent the compact is 
consistent with the provisions of this chapter.”117
These provisions put to rest some of the difficult questions that 
ordinarily come up in cases involving inaction. For example, 
whether a deemed approval constitutes action or inaction, that de-
cision is effectively “final” after forty-five days. No action would pre-
sumably not constitute action “unlawfully withheld” because the 
112. The provision states: “If the Secretary does not approve or disapprove a compact 
described in subparagraph (A) before the date that is 45 days after the date on which the 
compact is submitted to the Secretary for approval, the compact shall be considered to have 
been approved by the Secretary, but only to the extent the compact is consistent with the 
provisions of this chapter.” 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(C) (2012).
113. See, e.g., Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative Agency 
Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVT’L L.J. 461 (2008).
114. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
115. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012).
116. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2012).
117. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(A)–(C) (2012).
FALL 2018] Tribal-State Gaming Compacts 75
terms of the statute indicate clearly that Congress anticipated no 
action by the Secretary at least in some cases. Moreover, it would 
be unlikely for delay to be “unreasonable” because delay produces 
an automatic approval. Indeed, the very purpose of the provision is 
to produce resolution of the question of approval, whether or not 
action has occurred. 
However, these provisions raise different issues.
1. Agency Discretion and Resource Allocation
One question is whether the agency is really doing anything at 
all in a no-action approval. Although the distinction between ac-
tion and inaction is often a false one, the agency may be making 
no substantive choice at all in some cases. 
Perhaps the agency is overwhelmed with other pressing work 
and simply lacks the resources to address the compact before it. 
Moreover, perhaps it takes to heart the notion that a no-action ap-
proval means that a compact is approved only to the extent it does 
not violate IGRA. In such circumstances, the language of the stat-
ute would seem to be self-executing and would limit the harm of 
declining review, which is probably why Congress limited the effect 
of a no-action approval to lawful provisions. 
In the case where the agency is not actually making any substan-
tive choice, it is hard to argue that the agency is engaging in any 
action (or inaction) warranting review. In that instance, it is not 
the agency that issued the (no-action) approval; the approval was 
ordered by Congress, and it is essentially congressional action, not 
agency action, that gives the compact legal effect. 
In other words, in this circumstance, the question is not whether 
there was action or inaction, but whether it was by the agency. In 
the absence of any agency action, a decision occurs by default, but 
the decision was directed by Congress, not the agency.
Congressional actions are judicially reviewable, of course, but 
only as to assertions that they are unconstitutional.118 If such a case 
could be brought, it would be brought not under the APA and pre-
sumably not against the agency.
In light of the lack of mandatory words like “shall” and the 
seemingly permissive approach by Congress as to whether the Sec-
retary must act at all, a court must ask if this decision is exempted 
118. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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from review because it is “committed to agency discretion by 
law”?119 In such circumstances, it may be that Congress is leaving a 
resource allocation decision to the agency. 
One scholar has made a compelling argument that the single 
most important factor in determining whether the courts will grant 
judicial review is the extent to whether the decision involves alloca-
tion of agency resources.120 Existing Supreme Court decisions on 
agency inaction, including Heckler v. Chaney,121 Norton v. Southern 
Utah Wilderness Alliance,122 and Massachusetts v. EPA,123 are quite con-
sistent with this view.
It would be easy to conclude that the relevant section of IGRA 
presents precisely such a question, with Congress essentially telling 
the agency to make an affirmative decision of approval or disap-
proval if it chooses to use its staff resources to do so but to decline 
to engage if resources are unavailable. Given that the agency has 
made more than 800 decisions since IGRA was enacted, the re-
source allocation question is certainly relevant. Thus, in the no-
action approval context in which a party is seeking review, the best 
argument for the agency under the APA and Supreme Court prec-
edent may well be that the lack of action represents a resource al-
location question and the decision whether to act on a compact is 
committed to agency discretion by law. 
That claim, however, might ring hollow in the context in which 
the Secretary sent a lengthy deemed approval letter on the day af-
ter the forty-fifth day. Thus, blaming the inaction on resource allo-
cation may not be a complete solution. 
2. Agency Discretion in Enforcement
Given that the statute effectively makes approval automatic, with 
or without action, and gives the Secretary the power and discretion 
to disapprove a compact only in certain circumstances, one could 
liken the power of disapproval to enforcement. Essentially, Con-
gress has given the Department authority to block a compact to 
119. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012).
120. Biber, supra note 113.
121. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (addressing the presumption of unreviewa-
bility of decisions by agency not to undertake enforcement action).
122. Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004) (addressing 
agency’s alleged failure to manage off-road vehicle use).
123. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (addressing agency’s failure to take regu-
latory action with regard to greenhouse gas emissions).
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prevent it from becoming valid. In that respect, the compact review 
process is akin to an enforcement decision for the Secretary. 
Viewed in this light, judicial review of inaction would be like ju-
dicial review of the failure to take enforcement action. Enforce-
ment power is inherently executive in nature and, while the deci-
sion to exercise enforcement power is always subject to judicial 
review, the decision not to exercise enforcement power is almost 
never reviewable, in part for the resource allocation reasons identi-
fied above.124
In sum, whether viewed as a resource allocation question or an 
enforcement question, it seems quite unclear, and indeed doubt-
ful, that the APA authorizes actions against the Secretary for a no-
action or deemed approval.125 However, the simple no-action ap-
proval authorized by IGRA has been the subject of litigation in a 
handful of cases. 
B. Courts Have Struggled with No-Action Approvals
Though not unheard of, the no-action approval is fairly un-
common in federal law. From the perspective of routine adminis-
trative law and judicial review, it has remained something of an 
enigma. 
While dozens of federal statutes provide for an action to be 
“deemed approved” by law if a federal agency fails to act within a 
certain period of time, these provisions tend to exist in narrow cat-
egories, such as in federal monetary grant programs,126 in federal 
regulatory regimes that require federal approval of state govern-
mental implementation plans for federal programs,127 and in a 
handful of other contexts.128
124. Cf. Heckler, 470 U.S. 821.
125. To be clear, the analysis thus far has addressed the no-action approval in the ab-
sence of a deemed approval letter. That circumstance will be taken up below.
126. See, e.g., 34 U.S.C. § 10334 (2017) (application for grants to public entities to pro-
vide equipment and personnel training for the closed-circuit televising and video taping of 
the testimony of children in criminal proceedings for the violation of laws relating to the 
abuse of children deemed approved unless the agency official informs the applicant of rea-
sons for disapproval).
127. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 2342 (2012) (deemed approval of a state plan regarding adult 
career and technical education to which the federal Secretary of Education has not re-
sponded within 90 days); 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(13)(g)(iii) (2012) (state multimedia program 
to mitigate radon levels in indoor air approved if not disapproved within 180 days). In the 
same general category, but much more specific, is the approval of a county ordinance that 
must be approved by a federal agency. 16 U.S.C. § 544e (2012) (county scenic area land use 
ordinance deemed approved if the Columbia River Gorge Commission fails to act within 
78 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 52:1
The most common subject area for deemed approvals is in the 
area of Indian affairs, which has numerous statutory schemes in 
which approval has been deemed to have occurred unless a federal 
official, usually the Secretary, issues an affirmative disapproval.129
The legal effect of no-action approvals is sometimes the subject of 
litigation brought by Indian tribes against the agency, but usually 
in contract cases involving money, not APA actions.130
Recall that in IGRA, a gaming compact for which the Secretary 
has not acted within forty-five days is “deemed approved,” but only 
to the extent that the compact is consistent with IGRA.131 Similar 
limiting language is found in only one other statutory scheme, and 
it is also in the Indian affairs context. In the portion of the Indian 
Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000 that deal with Secre-
tarial approval of a tribal probate code, Congress provided that a 
tribal probate code, submitted for the approval of the Secretary of 
the Interior and not approved or disapproved within 180 days,
“shall be deemed to have been approved by the Secretary, but only 
to the extent that the tribal probate code is consistent with Federal 
law and promotes the policies set forth in section 102 of the Indian 
ninety days); 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(q)(2)(C) (2012) (approval of purchases of stocks by bank 
holding companies).
128. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1299 (2012) (where state has been delegated authority to run a 
federal grant program and a state has approved a grant application, the application will be 
deemed approved and funded if a federal official does not approve or disapprove the appli-
cation within forty-five days). See also 33 U.S.C. § 908(i)(1) (2012) (regarding disability 
claims by longshoreman and harbor workers); 47 U.S.C. § 252 (2012) (state public utility 
commissions charged with reviewing competitive market agreements between telecommuni-
cations carriers and local telephone exchanges).
129. 23 U.S.C. § 207(j)(2)(B)(iii) (2012) (application to waive a regulation with respect 
to a tribal transportation self-governance compact or funding agreement deemed approved 
after 90 days if not approved or denied); 25 U.S.C. § 5123 (2012) (If a tribe uses a special 
Secretarial election to adopt a constitution and bylaws or to amend the same, they become 
effective when the Secretary provides approval. “If the Secretary does not approve or disap-
prove the constitution and bylaws or amendments within the forty-five days, the Secretary’s
approval shall be considered as given.”); 25 U.S.C. § 2001(e)(2)(B) (2012) (in an applica-
tion for certain types of grant or contract funding for BIA or non-BIA schools educating In-
dian children, if the Secretary fails to make a determination with respect to an application 
within 180 days, the application shall be deemed to have been approved); Indian Higher 
Education Programs Tribal Grant Authorization, 25 U.S.C. § 3304 (2012).
130. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 852 F.3d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(holding that a ninety-day time limit on a federal response was not tolled during a partial 
government shutdown caused by a lapse in appropriations and thus that BIA’s letter partial-
ly declining a tribal funding request was late); Yurok Tribe v. Dep’t of the Interior, 785 F.3d 
1405 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that the BIA missed a ninety-day response deadline in the 
ISDA, triggering a “deemed approval,” but denying relief on another ground).
131. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(C) (2012).
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Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000.”132 This arcane pro-
vision has not been the subject of litigation.
To date, the highest courts to address the issue in the IGRA con-
text have tended to find judicial review available but have not ar-
ticulated compelling justifications. The first case to address the is-
sue arose in the Seventh Circuit. In Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake 
Superior Chippewa Indians v. Norton,133 two tribes challenged a third 
tribe’s gaming compact with the State of Wisconsin, arguing that 
the compact was unlawful because it had an anti-competitive provi-
sion that harmed two other tribes who were not parties to the 
compact. The compact had been submitted to the Secretary for 
approval, but because the Secretary failed to act within forty-five
days, the compact was deemed approved. The Secretary issued no 
letter.
Despite the fact that the compact had been approved by inac-
tion, the two tribes that were not parties to the compact sued the 
Secretary. The Secretary, through the Department of Justice, de-
fended the case.134 In defending, the Secretary raised two argu-
ments. First, she raised a standing issue, arguing that the Secre-
tary’s inaction could not have harmed the plaintiffs because the 
Secretary’s inaction could approve the compact only to the extent 
it is consistent with the law. In other words, illegal provisions were 
not deemed approved. 
The Seventh Circuit found this argument to be too clever. It 
held that the Secretary’s inaction “may have prevented the offend-
ing provisions from becoming effective in some academic sense”
but that “is a far cry from an explicit rejection by the Secretary.”135
132. 25 U.S.C. § 2205(b)(2)(B) (2012); id. § 2205(b)(2)(E)(ii) (emphasis added). The 
provision was added in 2000, several years after the enactment of IGRA. As in IGRA, the leg-
islative history for the provision is thin, but a Senate Report on the legislation suggests that 
the Congressional concern was that BIA may lack the resources to accomplish the review 
within 180 days. S. REP. NO. 106-361, at 15 (2000) (“Secretarial Approval.–Subsection 
206(b). Although existing law provides for Secretarial approval of tribal probate codes, this 
subsection establishes time-frames for Secretarial approval of proposed codes and amend-
ments. The bill also provides that the codes and amendments become effective upon the 
expiration of these time-frames to the extent they are consistent with Federal law. This will 
allow the codes to become operational even if the BIA is unable to formally approve the 
codes.”).
133. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Norton, 422 F.3d 490 
(7th Cir. 2005).
134. The Department of Justice’s defense of the Secretary under such circumstances is 
not always a foregone conclusion. See Washburn, supra note 61, at 311–12.
135. Lac du Flambeau, 422 F.3d at 501.
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Therefore “the Secretary’s silence was the functional equivalent of 
an affirmative approval.”136
After reaching these difficult questions, however, and finding 
that the Secretary’s inaction was subject to judicial review, the Sev-
enth Circuit avoided some of the harder questions by ruling for 
the Secretary on a second argument. The provision of IGRA that 
sets the approval/disapproval/no-action regime for compact re-
view provides that the Secretary “may” disapprove the compact for 
certain reasons only.137 Because IGRA says “may,” not “shall,” the 
Secretary argued that the decision to disapprove was committed to 
agency discretion by law.138 The court ultimately did not pass 
judgment on this argument, but found that the plaintiff had for-
feited the argument by failing to address it.139 It thus declined to 
exercise judicial review on this basis. In sum, it avoided reaching
the question of the ramifications of a deemed approval.
The Seventh Circuit’s approach is curious. One obvious way to 
interpret IGRA’s provisions on compact approval is to conclude 
that Congress gave the Secretary authority whether to regulate in 
any given case, either as the Secretary deems appropriate or as 
consistent with available staff resources. The Seventh Circuit sug-
gests that Congress either cannot or did not give the Secretary that
option. It is unclear from the Seventh Circuit’s decision whether
Congress lacks the power to create a no-action option for the Sec-
retary under these circumstances or it simply did not intend to do 
so. The Seventh Circuit’s ruling suggests that the Secretary has no 
choice but to make an affirmative decision as to each compact.140
The issue of review of a no-action approval next arose in a case 
in federal district court in Florida case called PPI, Inc. v. 
Kempthorne. In an unreported decision, the court found “clear and
convincing evidence that Congress intended to preclude judicial 
review.”141 It noted that in light of the forty-five-day deemed ap-
proval deadline, the “possibility of rewinding this process through 
APA review and sending the compact back to the Secretary for fur-
ther consideration is inimical to the clearly expressed intent by 
Congress that the compact be deemed approved after forty-five
136. Id.
137. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(B) (2012).
138. See Washburn, supra note 93, at 390.
139. Id.
140. Because this conclusion is so obviously contrary to Congressional intent, it is not 
very compelling.
141. PPI, Inc. v. Kempthorne, No. 4:08cv248-SPM, 2008 WL 2705431, at *5 (N.D. Fla.
July 8, 2008).
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days.”142 In short, the district court was more deferential than the 
Seventh Circuit to congressional intent to achieve quick resolution 
of compact review. It read the forty-five-day provision as a clear sig-
nal from Congress that no judicial review was appropriate in such 
circumstances.
The issue next arose in the federal courts in Washington, D.C. 
In Amador County v. Kempthorne, a county in California brought an 
APA “arbitrary and capricious” challenge to a no-action approval of 
a gaming compact between a tribe and the State of California.143
The county argued that the compact was illegal because it allowed 
a tribe to conduct gaming on land within the county that was not 
qualified for gaming under IGRA. 
Judge Richard W. Roberts of the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia held that IGRA gives the Secretary “three 
options—to approve, disapprove or take no action—and the stat-
ute provides no clear standard by which the Secretary must decide 
his course of action.” Lacking a standard to guide judicial review, 
the judge held that the decision is committed to agency discretion 
by law and is, therefore, unreviewable under the APA.144 Second, 
Judge Roberts highlighted the language in IGRA that a compact is 
approved by non-action “only to the extent the compact is con-
sistent with [IGRA],” concluding therefore that the Secretary could 
never approve by inaction any illegal provision in a compact.145 Be-
cause the inaction could therefore not produce illegality, there 
could be no injury from the failure to act. Judge Roberts ruled 
against the county. 
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit reversed.146 Begin-
ning by citing the strong presumption that Congress intends review 
of agency action,147 the court placed the burden on the agency to 
show that judicial review was precluded. It examined and rejected 
three arguments raised by the Secretary that no judicial review was 
available for a no-action approval. 
First, the Secretary argued that Congress intended to preclude 
judicial review when it limited the scope of an approval of a com-
pact by inaction; inaction results in approval, but only to the extent 
142. Id.
143. Amador County v. Kempthorne, 592 F. Supp. 2d 101 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d sub nom., 
Amador County v. Salazar, 640 F.3d 373, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
144. Amador County v. Kempthorne, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 106.
145. Id. at 107 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(C) (2012)).
146. Amador County v. Salazar, 640 F.3d 373, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
147. Id. at 379 (citing Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 
(1986)).
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the compact is consistent with IGRA. As to this argument, the D.C. 
Circuit echoed the Seventh Circuit in Lac du Flambeau. It explained 
that this provision does not set up any alternative mechanism to 
ensure compliance with the law because “someone—i.e. the 
courts—must decide whether those provisions are in fact lawful.”148
Presumably because it wanted to force the Secretary to conduct 
this review in the first instance, the court thus rejected the notion 
that the limited scope of the approval created an implication of no 
judicial review.
Second, the court examined the Secretary’s argument that the 
agency had been delegated broad discretion under the statute 
when Congress provided that the Secretary “is authorized to” ap-
prove such compacts and “may” disapprove in certain circumstanc-
es. The Secretary argued that, by using “may” rather than “shall,”
Congress intended that the decision whether to take any action 
falls entirely within the agency’s discretion.149
The court rejected the argument because, taken to its logical ex-
treme, the argument meant that the Secretary could act contrary to 
fact. In other words, the court appears to have credited an argu-
ment by Amador County that the provision would allow the Secre-
tary to turn a blind eye to obvious illegality and tacitly approve ac-
tion that the Secretary knows is illegal.150
The court cited three other cases in which “may” was interpreted 
as “shall” and indicated that it would do the same. It further said 
that the use of the word “may” was actually intended to limit the 
circumstances when the Secretary could disapprove a compact to 
the circumstances indicated in the statutory provision. In this re-
spect, the court interpreted the word “may” to mean “may only.”
And it found the listing of circumstances in the statutory provision 
to constitute “the law to apply,” which could provide the needed 
standards to guide judicial review.151
In sum, as in the Seventh Circuit, the D.C. Circuit implicitly re-
jected the notion that Congress could give the Secretary the power 
not to regulate.
Third, the Secretary argued that the forty-five-day time limit was
evidence that Congress intended to preclude judicial review, an 
argument that was convincing to the federal court in Florida in the 
unreported PPI decision. The D.C. Circuit simply rejected this ar-
148. Id. at 380.
149. Id. at 381.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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gument out of hand. It concluded that the caveat to no-action ap-
provals (that such compacts were approved only to the extent con-
sistent with law) was itself evidence “that Congress had no inten-
tion of trading compliance with IGRA’s requirements for efficiency 
in agency proceedings.”152
Finally, the Secretary also argued that only agency action, not 
inaction, is reviewable under the APA. Here, however, the court 
had already determined that “may” meant “shall,” so it made short 
work of the Secretary’s argument.
Federal administrative law offers a formal solution to the no ac-
tion problem in a limited range of circumstances. The APA pro-
vides that agency action includes a “failure to act.”153 While this 
provision provides a slender reed on which to hang judicial review, 
the law generally treats a failure to act as actionable only when a 
duty to act exists.154 In IGRA, one might argue that Congress clearly 
did not impose a duty on the agency to decide. Thus, the APA was 
not intended to be used in circumstances such as a no-action com-
pact approval. The court implicitly found otherwise when it said 
that “may” means “shall” and dismissed the notion that the agency 
had discretion.
Finding the action reviewable, the D.C. Circuit in Salazar then 
turned to the merits. Even still, the decision is equally unsatisfying. 
The relief sought by the plaintiff was not a remand for further ex-
planation, but a reversal of the no-action approval and a legal rul-
ing that the compact was illegal.155 The court found the administra-
tive and litigation record inadequate to make a decision and 
remanded to the district court for further action.156 Ultimately, on 
remand, the district court found the approval lawful, primarily by 
deferring to other determinations by the agency related to the 
tribe at issue. The D.C. Circuit then affirmed the district court’s
conclusion that the no-action compact approval was consistent with 
law.157
152. Id.
153. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012).
154. See generally Biber, supra note 113.
155. Appellant Amador County, California’s Principal Brief at 50–53, Amador County v. 
Salazar, No. 10-5240 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 13, 2010).
156. Amador County v. Salazar, 640 F.3d 373, 383–84 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Ultimately, a dif-
ferent panel of the D.C. Circuit ruled for the Secretary on the merits in an unpublished dis-
position, but without disturbing the earlier decision. See Amador County v. U.S. Dep’t of the 
Interior, 707 Fed. App’x 720 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (mem.).
157. Amador County v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 707 Fed. App’x 720 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(mem.) (affirming sub nom. Amador County v. S.M.R. Jewell, 170 F. Supp. 3d 135 (D.D.C. 
2016)).
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C. Reflecting on the Circuit Courts’ Approaches to 
No-Action Compact Approvals
The decisions in Lac du Flambeau and Salazar are difficult to 
square with ordinary notions of APA judicial review. Viewed in con-
text, the D.C. Circuit’s effort in Salazar appears intended to engage 
in sufficient legal gymnastics to ensure that it could provide a fo-
rum for no-action approvals. Yet, nearly every aspect of its reason-
ing feels strained. One critical law review article characterized its 
reasoning as “too acrobatic to be particularly compelling” in find-
ing “an implicit agency failure to decide not to disapprove.”158
Since judicial review of agency action ordinarily requires careful 
scrutiny by the court as to why the agency proceeded as it did, or-
dinary judicial review does not appear to be possible in the context 
in which an agency has said nothing, and particularly when it clear-
ly has authorization from Congress to proceed in this manner. 
Judicial review in this context is particularly mystifying because 
an agency presumably acts as an “agent” of Congress. In IGRA, 
Congress envisioned the compact review scheme with three possi-
ble outcomes, approval, disapproval, or no-action approval. The 
first and second options would presumably have a reasoned deci-
sion, but the third option routinely would not. In the third situa-
tion, it is an action of Congress, not the agency, which causes the 
compact to go into effect. Since the no-action approval scenario 
was ordered by Congress, not the agency, it could be argued that 
the no-action approval effectively reflects Congressional approval, 
rather than agency approval. In a case in which Congress mandates 
an outcome without any agency action, there simply is no “agency,”
in either sense of the word. But, of course, the APA does not au-
thorize general judicial review of actions by Congress. The natural 
reading of the provision enacted by Congress is that the agency 
may choose to regulate if it has the time and resources, but that 
Congress did not mandate action in every instance. 
Since Congress appears to have drafted IGRA to ensure that 
compact approval occurs within forty-five days, even if the Secre-
tary has not had a chance to review the compact, the D.C. Circuit’s
decision, as well as the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Lac du Flam-
beau, seems contrary to the express intentions of Congress in IGRA. 
In both cases, the courts strained to find a basis for review against 
158. Bryan Clark & Amanda Leiter, Regulatory Hide and Seek: What Agencies Can (and 
Can’t) Do to Limit Judicial Review, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1687, 1730 (2011).
FALL 2018] Tribal-State Gaming Compacts 85
fairly compelling arguments against such review. Moreover, neither 
case provided a merits review of agency inaction. Ultimately, nei-
ther decision is convincing. 
A further difficulty is that calling an action reviewable does not 
answer the harder question of available relief. In IGRA, Congress 
clearly contemplated that no-action approvals would occur. Admin-
istrative law often tends to be more concerned with process than 
substance. On remand to the agency, in a case involving a no-
action approval, the Secretary appears to have the authority take 
the same (non)action unless the court arrogated to itself the power 
to order the Secretary to act, despite the words in the statute. In-
deed, it is not clear how the courts can legitimately police the 
agency when it is acting as Congress authorized. 
In sum, circuit courts have not found a satisfying approach to 
the issue. The gestalt of the circuit court decisions is that courts are 
likely to find in favor of judicial review, whether or not there is 
content to review. The better argument appears to be that, whatev-
er the merits of a no-action compact approval, review is not availa-
ble when the agency took no action. 
That said, as noted above, the third option of no-action approval
has been joined by a fourth option in recent years, which might be 
characterized as the “no-action approval with formal comments 
from the agency.” While courts have struggled to find a compelling 
mode of judicial review for the no-action approval, the deemed 
approval letter presents the courts with different circumstances. 
Only on one occasion has a court had an opportunity to engage 
with a deemed approval letter and, as seen below, it was only in 
dicta.159 Still, it is enlightening and therefore worth considering.
D. Judge Lamberth and the First Deemed Approval Letter
Secretary Babbitt’s own 1997 letter was the subject of criticism by 
a judge not long after it was issued. Based largely on the language 
in Secretary Babbitt’s original deemed approval letter, two New 
Mexico tribes asked the federal district court in Washington, D.C., 
for a declaratory judgment that the provisions requiring the tribes 
to share gaming revenues with the state were illegal. The tribes 
159. According to the GAO, “no court has issued a decision considering the extent to 
which a deemed approval letter is consistent with IGRA.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-15-355, INDIAN GAMING: REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT BY THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT 20 n.38 (2015).
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sought to strike the illegal provisions from the New Mexico com-
pacts while nevertheless preserving the compacts themselves.
Though declining to grant relief himself, the colorful Judge 
Royce Lamberth characterized Secretary Babbitt’s deemed approv-
al letter as an “attempt to evade responsibility.”160 According to 
Judge Lamberth, 
[t]he Secretary’s decision makes plain that he considered 
the revenue sharing and regulatory fee provisions illegal, 
and yet he declined to disapprove the compacts. Instead, 
the Secretary approved the compacts and sought to evade 
responsibility by including a denunciation of the illegal 
provisions—a denunciation which he must have known 
would be unenforceable in court.161
These words were dicta in large part because Judge Lamberth 
himself dodged the substantive issue. The court ultimately held 
that the litigation could not proceed without an indispensable par-
ty, the state, and the state’s immunity prevented it from being 
joined in the litigation.162 Thus, he dismissed the action.
Judge Lamberth’s views as to Secretary Babbitt’s letter, though 
strongly presented, are not very compelling.
First, Judge Lamberth’s words did not address the practical issue 
that the Secretary faced. The options faced by the Department and 
tribes to address unfair compact negotiation terms following Sem-
inole Tribe were suddenly less obvious. An affirmative disapproval 
would address the problematic compact terms but possibly at great 
cost to a tribe and in a manner that would undermine Congress’s
purposes in enacting IGRA. If the Secretary disapproved the com-
pact, the tribes presumably would have been unable to engage law-
fully in Class III gaming for the lack of an approved gaming com-
pact under IGRA. The Secretary generally lacks the authority to 
strike a particular provision that is problematic and approve the 
rest.163 In other words, the Secretary generally lacks a “line-item ve-
160. Pueblo of Sandia v. Babbitt, 47 F. Supp. 2d 49, 56 (D.D.C. 1999).
161. Id. at 56–57.
162. Id. at 49.
163. The Secretary presumably has this power only if the parties have so indicated in the 
compact itself. See, e.g., Letter from George T. Skibine, Acting Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Pol-
icy and Econ. Dev., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to the Hon. LaRue Martin Parker, Chairman, 
Caddo Nation of Okla. (July 24, 2006) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform) (finding an illegal provision in the compact but noting that the compact provided 
that provisions found illegal by the Secretary were severable).
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to” for problematic provisions in compacts. On the other hand, an 
affirmative approval would have the effect of allowing gaming, 
while simultaneously providing Departmental validation of unfair 
terms. In sum, either approval or disapproval likely would have 
placed the tribes in a worse position than a no-action approval. 
The Secretary—and presumably the tribes—were stuck between a 
rock and a hard place. They were placed in this awkward position 
not by their own action but by the Supreme Court’s change to
Eleventh Amendment law after IGRA was enacted.
Judge Lamberth’s views may reflect his own frustration with the 
state of affairs post-Seminole Tribe more than his actual views. In-
deed, he called on Congress to enact legislation to address the un-
derlying problem created by the Seminole Tribe decision.164
Second, Judge Lamberth’s assumption that courts are powerless 
to address illegal provisions is curious.165 A compact is simply a con-
tract between sovereigns, with courts tending to apply principles of 
contract law in addressing them.166 It is not at all clear that an ille-
gal contract provision is enforceable in the courts. Though the sub-
ject of illegality in contracts is confronted much more often in first-
year law school contract courses than in actual practice, it is a black 
letter principle of contracts law that a contract that is illegal or in 
violation of public policy may be unenforceable.167
While Judge Lamberth did not believe that he could reach the 
issue in the posture of the case before him,168 a different case pos-
ture might have produced a different result. If, for example, a tribe 
stopped making revenue sharing payments that the Secretary had 
found illegal, it is likely that a state would sue, and a court would 
resolve the dispute. If the clause were illegal, the court would de-
termine whether the contract or the provision is nevertheless en-
forceable. While it would be a risky, high stakes battle to wage, it is 
not certain that a tribe would lose a case in that posture.
In sum, while we can credit Judge Lamberth for speaking out 
and providing a view of a deemed approval letter, his views also do
not provide a roadmap for how courts should address such letters. 
164. Pueblo of Sandia, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 57.
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians v. California, 813 F.3d 1155, 1163 
(9th Cir. 2015).
167. United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520 (1961) (declining 
under federal law to enforce a contract that conflicted with a federal statute); Schlessinger v. 
Valspar Corp., 686 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2012) (“As a general rule, New York courts will not 
enforce illegal contracts.”).
168. Pueblo of Sandia, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 56.
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E. A Sensible Approach to Judicial Review When the 
Agency Has Provided Its Views
Judge Lamberth’s harsh criticism of a deemed approval letter 
may not be particularly convincing, but his critique of the Secre-
tary’s action feels more legitimate than the approaches taken by 
the Seventh Circuit in Lac du Flambeau or the D.C. Circuit in Sala-
zar. This is because in Pueblo of Sandia v. Babbitt, unlike in the D.C. 
Circuit or the Seventh Circuit cases, the Secretary acted somewhat 
strategically.
To his credit, Judge Lamberth addressed a type of “action” by 
the Secretary and grappled with the Secretary’s views. He certainly 
took the agency to task and leveled a reasonable critique, but he 
did so only after it had given substantive views. The circuit court 
decisions, on the other hand, strained mightily to hold the agency 
responsible when there is no clear evidence that the it had even 
thought about the question. This is illogical and inconsistent with 
the purpose of judicial review under the APA.
One problem with the circuit courts’ approach is that judicial 
review is especially difficult when we do not know the reasons for 
the agency’s action. How do we know if the agency acted arbitrarily 
or unreasonably if, for example, we do not know why the agency 
took a particular course of action? It seems far more feasible to ac-
complish the goals of judicial review when the views of the agency 
are available, and it also seems more legitimate to hold an agency 
accountable when it has acted affirmatively.
Thus, perhaps the line to be drawn is related to whether the 
agency provided reasoning with which to consider the basis for its 
action or inaction. Ordinarily, a no-action approval would not ap-
pear to reflect considered judgment or the agency’s careful reason-
ing. However, a deemed approval letter gives a court a substantive 
position to review.
In some ways, a deemed approval letter reflects a partial ratifica-
tion of the approval ordered in the statute. In sum, the Secretary 
has effectively adopted the approval with caveats. Courts ought to 
appreciate the Department’s willingness to draft deemed approval 
letters to accompany no-action approvals because the existence of 
a letter solves the thorny administrative law problem in such cases 
by explaining why the agency proceeded as it did.169 In other 
169. See generally Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 83 F.3d 167 (7th Cir. 1996) (Pos-
ner, J.). Judge Posner, in a slightly different context dealing with so-called interpretive rules, 
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words, a letter provides a reasoned explanation for why the De-
partment failed to act affirmatively and gives the court a reasoned 
decision to evaluate the legality of the compact in such circum-
stances. In sum, the deemed approval letter furnishes that which is 
lacking in the ordinary no-action approval scenario—agency rea-
soning. In that respect, a deemed approval letter functions much 
more as an affirmative agency decision.
The legislative record for IGRA, which is limited, suggests that 
Congress sought quick resolution and worried that typical agency 
bureaucratic processes around difficult political decisions would 
prevent timely resolution of compact validity. A no-action approval 
allows tribes and states to obtain quick resolution of the issue of 
compact approval and, presumably, get on with business. In the 
absence of a decision or other letter by the Secretary, the APA 
should not be perverted to provide judicial review of a non-action 
and, thus, potentially frustrate congressional intent.
When the Secretary issues a letter nearly simultaneously with the 
no-action approval, on the other hand, it demonstrates that the 
agency had the time and resources to make the decision, and it ac-
tually has engaged in reasoned decision making. The existence of 
the letter itself, in some ways, differentiates a compact that was ac-
tually “reviewed” by agency officials and an “unreviewed” compact. 
Where the agency has actually reviewed a compact and chosen to 
provide its views, it would not be inappropriate for the agency to 
be held accountable under the APA for its work. This is true in 
part because the Secretary’s letter creates some winners and los-
ers.170
Finally, it is odd that an affirmative approval would be reviewa-
ble, but a no-action approval would be unreviewable. Courts are 
likely to be skeptical of agency behavior because the agency might 
be acting strategically, perhaps to avoid judicial review. The pur-
pose of judicial review is, presumably in most cases, to prevent a 
government agency from causing harm for which it is unaccounta-
ble. 
Strategic behavior to avoid judicial review may be in the eye of 
the beholder. In Salazar, the court seemed to be persuaded in part 
by the appellant’s claim that if the court followed the plain text of 
the statute and the Secretary could do nothing in the face of obvi-
ous illegality, the Secretary could be complicit in allowing an illegal 
suggests that courts should encourage agencies to give voice to their views rather than hide 
them from the public.
170. See discussion infra Part III.
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compact to go into effect, evading an implicit responsibility in 
IGRA to enforce the law or, worse, perhaps even wrongfully shield-
ing known illegality. My own long experience in government sug-
gests that overworked government officials are rarely diabolical 
enough or well-organized enough to successfully engage in illegal 
conspiracies. The notion that an illegal compact could go into ef-
fect, however, is possible, of course, and that is the reason for 
deemed approval letters.
In sum, it may well be that judicial review under the APA is cog-
nizable for deemed approval letters, and standing doctrine will 
provide reasonable limits on such cases.
Thus, a more sensible line to draw might be: A no-action ap-
proval is unreviewable unless the agency has issued a deemed ap-
proval letter to accompany its non-action, in which case the agen-
cy’s views are reviewable.
F. What Level of Deference, If Any, 
Should a Deemed Approval Letter Receive?
Suggesting that deemed approval letters are important in judi-
cial review raises the obvious question: What level of judicial defer-
ence, if any, should an agency deemed approval letter receive from 
the courts? As noted above, it may not be in an APA action in 
which a deemed approval letter will be reviewed. It is possible that 
such a letter will be reviewed, if at all, in the context of other litiga-
tion. The question is whether the letter is entitled to Chevron def-
erence, so-called Skidmore respect, or no deference at all.171
In light of the fact that Seminole Tribe caused a significant disrup-
tion to IGRA with subtle, ripple effects through the entire statutory 
scheme, decision making in this area rests on ambiguities about 
how to apply the statutory scheme to changed circumstances. Giv-
en these ambiguities, the deemed approval letter reflects a prag-
matic act by the Department to address changed circumstances. 
The general argument for respect for formal decision letters 
from the Department is strong. First, Congress has identified clear 
goals to guide the agency’s decision making.172 Second, Congress 
clearly and specifically addressed matters of compact approval di-
171. See generally Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (comparing Chevron
deference and Skidmore respect).
172. 25 U.S.C. § 2701(4) (2012) (“a principal goal of Federal Indian policy is to promote 
tribal economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government”).
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rectly to the agency, a factor that many commentators believe to be 
crucial in deference calculus.173 Third, the decisions involve deli-
cate political matters of state-tribal relations and the federal trust 
relationship with Indian tribes, both of which are matters squarely 
within the Department’s expertise174 and Congress specifically ref-
erenced such expertise, in the most relevant provision of IGRA.175
Fourth, the letters are usually signed at the highest levels within 
the agency, such as the Secretary, or the Assistant Secretary for In-
dian Affairs, both presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed offi-
cials. Fifth, the statute clearly assigned approval or disapproval to 
the agency, and though the D.C. Circuit did not agree in Amador 
County, appeared to give the Secretary discretion in plain language 
as to how to proceed, though it is cabined to a degree. In sum, 
agency compact approvals or disapprovals are likely to deserve def-
erence. 
A deemed approval letter, however, may not merit the same def-
erence as a formal agency approval or disapproval. First, as noted 
above, while Congress delegated direct decision-making authority 
to the Department, it probably did not contemplate this innovative 
use of non-action. Moreover, in a deemed approval, approval oc-
curs by default. In other words, it is really the statute drafted by 
Congress, not the agency, that is doing the decision-making work. 
A deemed approval letter reflects the opinion of the agency in a 
circumstance when it has considered but presumably declined to 
use its formal decision-making authority. In that respect, a deemed 
approval letter might be considered as dicta in a judicial opinion. 
It reflects the expression of views on a matter that the agency has 
declined to decide formally. It is more akin to an advisory opinion 
by a thoughtful commentator with broad experience and expertise 
173. See, e.g., Thomas Merrill & Kristin Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 
(2001). The Supreme Court has tended to treat the formality of the agency decision-making 
process as crucial in determining whether Chevron deference should apply to agency deci-
sions. See, e.g., Christensen, 529 U.S. 576 (contrasting an opinion letter with formal adjudica-
tion and notice-and-comment rulemaking). However, the Court has sometimes downplayed 
formality as a significant factor. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) 
(noting that informal agency interpretations had received deference in the past).
174. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (citing such factors as “the intersti-
tial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the 
question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the 
careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of time” in sup-
port of Chevron deference).
175. 15 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(B)(iii) (2012).
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in the area, as reflected in the nearly 800 compact decision letters 
that the Department has made.176
To be sure, the Department might be an excellent source for 
guidance on IGRA interpretation. No institution has greater famil-
iarity with the Indian gaming compact negotiation context or the 
political and economic consequences of its actions. In light of this 
expertise, it is reasonable to believe that its views will be thoughtful 
and persuasive. To the extent the Department has articulated fed-
eral Indian policy concerns about a provision, its views may not de-
serve robust Chevron-type deference but are likely to be entitled to 
that which is often characterized in administrative law as “Skidmore
respect.”177 In other words, its views should persuade a court to the 
extent that they are well-articulated and compelling.
Of course, to the extent that a deemed approval letter calls out 
an illegal provision in a compact, the court is competent to address 
those questions and arguably needs no guidance from an agency. 
If a compact goes into effect in the absence of formal action by the 
agency, the residual question is a legal one: Are any of the provi-
sions of the compact inconsistent with IGRA?178 Courts are quite 
capable of addressing straightforward questions of statutory inter-
pretation. While it might provide the court some comfort to know 
the agency’s views, a court has no obligation to defer to the agen-
cy’s views.
Nevertheless, from an administrative law point of view, two of 
the important values that animate federal administrative law are 
reasoned decision making and transparency. Deemed approval let-
ters serve both values. They explain why the Department decided 
to proceed as it did. Because understanding agency motivation is 
critically important in administrative law, one common outcome of 
judicial review of agency action in which the agency failed to pro-
vide an adequate explanation of the basis for its action is a remand 
to the agency for a more adequate explanation. In this respect, 
deemed approval letters further the ultimate conclusion of an ac-
tion by providing that view. Thus, a deemed approval letter should 
be viewed as positive. It can aid a court in understanding the Exec-
utive Branch’s views about the underlying policy concerns that an-
176. See Indian Gaming Compacts, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://
www.indianaffairs.gov/as-ia/oig/gaming-compacts (last visited Oct. 12, 2018) (listing ap-
proximately 800 decisions).
177. For a discussion of the difference between Chevron and Skidmore, see generally Chris-
tensen, 529 U.S. 576.
178. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012).
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imate the law. Moreover, the information is objective and provided 
outside the context of any litigation.
III. THE NORMATIVE QUESTION: ARE DEEMED APPROVAL LETTERS 
GOOD POLICY OR BAD?
Whether a deemed approval letter is subject to judicial review 
and whether the positions set out in such letters should be respect-
ed by a court are important but ultimately narrow questions. Since
only one has ever been discussed at any length in a reported judi-
cial decision, and only in dicta, their significance may not hinge on 
the ways in which they affect rights in litigation. Thus, the more 
important question is whether using deemed approval letters re-
flects good or bad federal policy. To assess this question, it is im-
portant to understand the broader context in which they are is-
sued, the reasons that they are issued, and the practical 
ramifications of their use. Ultimately, a deemed approval letter ap-
pears to be better than no letter. 
A. The Fiscal and Political Contexts of 
Agency Decision Making in Indian Gaming
As noted in the introduction, Indian gaming annually produces 
in excess of $30 billion in revenue in Indian country. Given the 
importance of this revenue source to tribes and the moral burden 
caused by the failure of the United States to meet various responsi-
bilities to tribal nations, disapproval of a compact is likely to be 
viewed as a bad option for the Secretary.
In light of the vast revenues involved, political considerations
weigh heavily, and not just because money buys influence in Wash-
ington. The Department faces immense political pressure to not 
disapprove a compact. A compact is, by definition, an agreement 
by two sovereigns who have reached a meeting of the minds after 
engaging in a lengthy negotiation process and difficult compro-
mises. A signed compact usually reflects the culmination of months
or years of negotiation and significant legislative and executive 
processes within state and tribal sovereign governments. In most 
other circumstances, it is a happy occurrence for the federal gov-
ernment when a state and a tribe have reached agreement on a
controversial matter. 
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A disapproval is likely to be a disappointment to both the state 
and the tribe and is likely to be an especially significant disap-
pointment to a tribe. A tribe may have developed significant plans 
and investment around the expectation of an approved compact. 
The Department generally owes a trust responsibility to tribes, 
meaning that the Department has a general responsibility to look 
out for the best interests of the tribe. Department officials under-
stand, better than almost anyone other than tribal leaders, the im-
portance of strong tribal economic development. It is difficult to 
tell a tribe that no gaming development—no jobs, no revenues—is 
better than the deal that the tribe negotiated with the state. Disap-
proval is likely to have significant short-term negative effects for 
that tribe. Moreover, those short-term negative effects are likely to 
ripen into long-term negative affects if the state refuses to negoti-
ate further. Following a disapproval, the Department cannot be 
sure that a state will return to the negotiating table with a tribe. 
The result is that a disapproval could prevent the tribe from ever 
engaging in Class III gaming despite the right recognized by Con-
gress to do so. In other words, following a disapproval, a tribe may 
never have the opportunity to benefit from gaming revenues. From 
the tribe’s perspective, it is often presumed paternalistic for the 
Department of the Interior to disapprove an agreement that the 
tribe has negotiated and believes is in its best interest. 
Likewise, compact disapproval could deeply disappoint the state 
that has entered the compact, which may be expecting revenue 
sharing or other benefits through the compact.179 In many states, a 
governor’s or legislature’s decision to engage with one or more 
tribes and to negotiate a compact is a significant political decision. 
To the state, it may be perceived as the height of arrogance for 
federal officials in Washington, D.C., to second guess the deal 
struck by the negotiating parties within the state.
Moreover, because of the amount of money involved, other 
powerful external political forces are often brought to bear to dis-
courage the Department from issuing a disapproval. For example, 
gaming often brings developers from the private sector who them-
selves often enlist expensive lobbyists. The lobbyists, in turn, can 
179. For colorful accounts, see Sean P. Murphy, In Casino Deal, Fed Felt the Heat from 
Mass., BOSTON GLOBE (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2016/
09/29/casino-deal-feds-felt-heat-from-mass/j5UIx7XrX0ie4y7GH2FP2K/story.html; Tony 
Batt, Mashpee Casino Sparked Obama Administration Infighting, GAMBLING COMPLIANCE (Sept. 
29, 2016), https://gamblingcompliance.com/premiumcontent/news_analysis/mashpee-
casino-sparked-obama-administration-infighting.
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often engage members of Congress to reach out to the decision 
makers in the Department. In sum, for both fiscal and political 
reasons, the Department is loath to disapprove compacts. 
For all these reasons, and in light of the Department’s trust re-
sponsibility to tribes, the no-action approval and the deemed ap-
proval letter might be considered a thoughtful and nuanced re-
sponse to a complicated problem. 
B. How Does the Department of the Interior Use the 
Deemed Approval Letter Strategy?
The ultimate purpose of the no-action approval accompanied by 
a deemed approval letter is to lower the stakes of decision making 
by allowing the Secretary to place legitimate concerns on the rec-
ord while nevertheless allowing the parties to proceed with the 
gaming endeavor. Frankly, this can be called political expediency.
While political expediency is not usually viewed as a positive good 
in the application of the law, it is clear that in this case the law 
failed. Congress sought to use a provision to protect tribal interests 
that was later declared unconstitutional. While one might blame 
Congress for this error, the Supreme Court changed the law on 
state constitutional immunity in Seminole Tribe after IGRA’s enact-
ment, using IGRA as the vehicle to reinterpret the Constitution. 
This result left tribes without protection that Congress clearly in-
tended tribes to have. 
While the use of deemed approval letters could possibly be 
abused, and the Department has occasionally found new uses for 
them, they are still relatively rare. Generally, deemed approval let-
ters are used in at least three broad situations. First, the terms in a 
compact may be ambiguous. In that circumstance, the Department 
can express its views as to the lawful interpretation of the terms 
and express an expectation that the ambiguous terms will be ap-
plied in a lawful manner.180
Second, the Department may have real concerns about a partic-
ular term, but it may be unlikely that facts that make the term rele-
vant will occur in the real world. For example, a compact may pro-
vide that a tribe provide the state a revenue share of twenty-five
percent of net gaming revenue above a certain annual threshold, 
180. See, e.g., Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs, U.S. 
Dep’t of the Interior, to the Hon. Ty Vicenti, President, Jicarilla Apache Nation 3 (June 9, 
2015), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/oig/oig/pdf/idc1-031301.pdf.
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such as $1 billion dollars. If the gaming operation’s annual reve-
nues are currently below $100 million and not expected to go so 
high, the Department might find that the term is unlikely to ever 
become operable.181 It could be gratuitously harmful to disapprove 
a compact when the risk of actual harm is nonexistent. 
Finally, the Department may issue a deemed approval if the 
compact is generally good for the tribe, and it contains only one or 
two serious issues of concern or a few minor issues. For example, 
despite the Department’s concerns, a tribe’s newly negotiated 
compact may objectively constitute a marked improvement across a 
wide range of subjects over the tribe’s existing compact. In rare 
cases such as this, the Department may issue a deemed approval
letter so as not to “let the perfect be the enemy of the good.”182 In 
some respects, the deemed approval letter is an expedient solution 
to a difficult problem, particularly when compacts give the De-
partment significant concern, but do not present any actual risk to 
the tribe.
Such letters are also used to communicate general views about 
Indian gaming and to address various specific concerns. When the 
letters are circulated widely, they perform the role that any agency 
regulatory guidance might perform. They signal to the regulated 
industry what is and is not acceptable in gaming compact negotia-
tions. This promotes adherence to the law. While adherence to 
IGRA was undermined by Seminole Tribe’s evisceration of the provi-
sions allowing tribes to sue states, the no-action approval and 
deemed approval letter can be used to reassert the purposes of 
IGRA and limit some of the problems spawned by revenue sharing.
An interesting question is whether the Secretary or other agency 
official will behave differently based on whether the decision will 
be subject to judicial review. Judicial review quite clearly has an 
impact on agency decision making. If an agency decision is ulti-
mately subject to judicial review, a greater effort will be made to 
obtain review of agency lawyers and perhaps even Department of 
Justice lawyers to ensure that the final decision is defensible. How-
ever, in the run of cases, especially those with forty-five-day dead-
lines, strategic thinking in anticipation of litigation is usually 
181. See, e.g., Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs, U.S. 
Dep’t of the Interior, to the Hon. Russell Attebery, Chairman of the Karuk Tribe 3 (Nov. 12, 
2014), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/oig/oig/pdf/idc1-028626.pdf.
182. FRANCOIS MARIE AROUET (VOLTAIRE), DICTIONNAIRE PHILOSOPHIQUE PORTATIF
(1764), reprinted in CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 797 (Susan Ratcliffe ed., 
6th ed. 2011).
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somewhat limited. Moreover, considering the pace of civil litiga-
tion in the United States and the average tenure of agency political 
officials, it is doubtful that any agency official feels the breath of a 
federal judge breathing down her neck. The agency official is likely 
to act based much more on her view of the correct policy decision 
and in view of the parties before her. The official will usually be 
long gone before any judicial decision on that action is issued.
C. Practical Ramifications of the 
Deemed Approval Provision and Letters
The forty-five-day provision has been highly successful in pro-
ducing resolution of decisions. While decisions sometimes languish 
at the Department of the Interior, and some decisions may still 
languish in other contexts, gaming compact decisions are given 
significant attention. Despite a small staff focused on these issues,183
the staff has significant expertise, and a decision within the forty-
five-day timeline is almost always possible. In the last twenty years, it 
has rarely been the case that the time runs simply because the rele-
vant decision maker has not yet made up his mind. On the contra-
ry, in most instances, a careful decision is made as to how to pro-
ceed. This is, in part, why the deemed approval letter is such a 
curious development. Today, when the options are discussed with 
the Interior decision maker, all four options are always on the ta-
ble.
The deemed approval provision in IGRA has produced results. If 
there is any doubt that the decision-forcing mechanism has been 
successful in achieving quick resolution of decisions, compare an-
other regime created by the same statute that lacks a decision-
forcing mechanism: Section 20 of IGRA generally prohibits a tribe 
from engaging in Indian gaming on lands acquired by a tribe after 
the statute was enacted in 1988. The provision against gaming on 
“after-acquired” lands was intended generally to prevent expansion 
of gaming beyond existing Indian lands. To prevent the provision 
from producing harsh consequences, however, the law created sev-
eral exceptions. One of the exceptions provides that a tribe can 
conduct gaming on newly-acquired lands if the Secretary obtains 
183. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-355, INDIAN GAMING: REGULATION 
AND OVERSIGHT BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, STATES, AND TRIBES 13, 13 n.29 (2015) (not-
ing that the Office of Indian Gaming at Interior had seven staff, a budget of approximately 
$1.1 million in fiscal year 2014, and “an average of eight staff since 1993”).
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the concurrence of the state where the lands lie. The procedure, 
called a “two-part” determination, contains no time limit for the 
initial secretarial action, but gives the state’s governor twelve 
months, with the opportunity for a six-month extension, to decide 
whether to concur. These so-called “two-part determinations” are 
rare and must begin with the Secretary. Because there is no deci-
sion-forcing regime on the Secretary, a tribe’s request to the De-
partment for a two-part determination routinely requires years.184
A deemed approval may also help the Secretary avoid certain 
negative legal ramifications of an approval. For example, an af-
firmative approval would likely imbue the decision with the impri-
matur of agency expertise, which may well be entitled to defer-
ence. In other words, because an agency approval has the effect of 
approving the terms in a contract, those terms would be presumed 
lawful if approved by the expert agency assigned by Congress the 
task of interpreting and implementing IGRA. These are often cir-
cumstances in which the Department would prefer not to issue an 
approval. In contrast, a no-action approval would presumably be 
entitled to less deference and would involve lower stakes.
For the parties, a deemed approval letter probably has little sig-
nificant impact. Given their interest in obtaining approval, it is 
doubtful that it causes significant reevaluation or renegotiation. 
However, it may well constitute a line in the sand for the Depart-
ment that affects future negotiations. Moreover, it communicates a 
message to the industry more broadly and may place some side 
guards—or a ceiling—on the amount of revenue sharing in future 
compacts, providing notice, and preventing surprise disapprovals. 
In that sense, the deemed approval letter should be applauded 
by anyone who seeks transparency in governmental decision mak-
ing. While Congress did not require the Department to explain its 
view in the “deemed approval” context and likely did not contem-
plate a letter in these circumstances, the so-called fourth option is 
a useful way for the Department to meet its difficult responsibilities 
to tribes and the public under IGRA in implementing an imperfect 
statute. In sum, the deemed approval letter ought to be considered 
a positive development and a better alternative than a simple no-
action approval without an explanation.
184. See, e.g., Becky Kramer, Spokane Tribe Breaks Ground on West Plans Casino, Plans for 
2017 Opening, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Nov. 9, 2016, 4:20 PM), http://www.spokesman.com/
stories/2016/nov/09/spokane-tribe-breaks-ground-on-west-plains-casino-/#/0 (“The Spo-
kane Tribe first proposed the casino development in 2006, but waited nine years from the 
green-light from the U.S. Department of Interior to build the off-reservation casino.”).
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D. The Costs of the Approach
Now that the practical benefits of the approach for the Secretary 
and the parties are clear, it is wise to consider the costs of such an 
approach. Political expedience is likely to have costs. The costs re-
late to uncertainty and possibly creating winners and losers.
1. Uncertainty
Because the relevant provision of IGRA clearly says that a “com-
pact is [deemed] approved [but] only to the extent it is consistent 
with law,” a no-action approval necessarily raises the question of 
how much of the compact is legal.185 As result of the “only to the 
extent it is consistent with law” language, a no-action approval 
leaves potentially the entire compact “up for grabs” in a future le-
gal action. Uncertainty around economic matters is generally not 
considered a salutary benefit. Indeed, between ordinary commer-
cial actors, if for example the legality of payments of millions of 
dollars is at issue, we would expect there to be litigation.
Two answers present themselves. First, a disapproval is a high 
stakes outcome that the compacting parties may wish to avoid. In-
deed, it may be a tragedy for a tribe and a major disappointment 
for a state. If a deemed approval letter allows the Department to 
approve most of the terms and allows the business relationship to 
move forward in a constructive manner, the parties may be happy 
to live with some uncertainty. Moreover, since Congress wrote the 
provision, Congress must have anticipated such uncertainty. Given 
the paucity of reported decisions on matters related to compact 
provisions identified as problematic in deemed approval letters, it 
is likely that the uncertainty has not created a significant prob-
lem.186
Second, a deemed approval letter from the Secretary could di-
minish the scope of uncertainty by narrowing the issues about 
which uncertainty remains. If the Secretary declines to approve or 
185. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(C).
186. To be sure, some compacts employ a compact dispute resolution process in which 
the parties have chosen an arbitration forum. Thus, looking at reported decisions may un-
derestimate the existence of litigation. It may be that the issues are being litigated, just not 
in a forum in which they reach the federal case reporters. See, e.g., PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE AND 
STATE OF ARIZONA GAMING COMPACT § 15(c) (2003), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/
files/assets/as-ia/oig/oig/pdf/idc1-024640.pdf (providing for arbitration of certain disputes 
between the Tribe and the State).
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disapprove a compact but calls out certain provisions as problemat-
ic in a deemed approval letter, the letter may serve to preserve the 
legal issue for a potential showdown in future negotiations or liti-
gation. The letter may also function, however, as a tacit or even 
explicit approval of the other provisions in the compact. In that re-
spect, it may have the effect of narrowing any future claims of un-
certainty about the compact. In sum, the deemed approval letter 
may lessen the uncertainty inherent in a no-action approval by nar-
rowing the scope of that uncertainty. In that respect, the deemed 
approval letter is good for the parties and the courts.
2. Who Wins? Who Loses?
Another cost or potential disadvantage of deemed approval let-
ters is that they create winners and losers. For this reason, deemed 
approval letters are not always applauded. In IGRA, Congress pre-
sumably presupposed an arms-length bargaining process between 
the tribe and the state and a negotiated solution reflected in the 
compact. Usually, the loser in a deemed approval letter is the state. 
Through a deemed approval letter, the Secretary usually suggests
that that the law forbids some of the terms of a compact. Thus, a 
natural objection by states is that the deemed approval essentially 
casts doubt on terms that the state negotiated, potentially rewriting 
the compact. Thus, states may object that the deemed approval let-
ter is designed to improve the terms of the deal for the tribe after 
the fact and without any real accountability. This may even appear 
to be bias in the decision-making process at Interior.
The answer is easy. First, since the oversight role of the Depart-
ment in the compact approval process is generally considered to 
be an exercise of the federal trust responsibility, the Department is 
almost always primarily concerned with protecting the interests of 
the tribe. The entire IGRA regulatory structure is designed to pro-
tect tribes, not states. Congress gave states the opportunity to ad-
dress significant state regulatory concerns in compacts, but it
feared state overreach in tribal negotiations.187 Therefore, Congress 
gave the approval power to the Secretary. Another example of 
Congress’s clear focus is the fact that IGRA imposes no duty on 
tribes to negotiate in good faith. It imposes this duty only on states. 
187. Cf. Kevin Gover & Tom Gede, The States as Trespassers in a Federal-Tribal Relationship: 
A Historical Critique of Tribal-State Compacting Under IGRA, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 185, 190–91 (2010) 
(citing S. REP. NO. 100-446, at 13 (1988)).
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In other words, the Department is carrying out the general role 
that Congress intended and using tools that Congress provided for 
the task. 
CONCLUSION
The deemed approval letter is a curious development. At worst, 
this manner of decision making might be seen as an abdication of 
responsibility by the expert agency charged with making an affirm-
ative decision, resulting in the postponement of an important deci-
sion and transfer of the decision from the expert agency to anoth-
er forum.
When Congress created the deemed approval provision for any 
compact not addressed within forty-five days, however, it created a 
solution that has had significant pragmatic value. Indeed, because 
millions of dollars may hang in the balance for a tribe through de-
velopment of a gaming operation and for a state through the po-
tential revenue sharing, the deemed approval provision’s facilita-
tion of quick decisions is important to economic development. 
In light of the lack of reported decisions dealing with deemed 
approval letters, it is clear that their practical value has been far 
more important than their value in litigation. At bottom, the 
deemed approval lowers the stakes of decision making for the De-
partment because it allows the tribe to call out state overreaching 
without forcing tribes to pay the penalty of not being able to con-
duct gaming. For the Secretary, the “deemed approved” approach 
has been an expedient answer to the problems faced by the regula-
tory regime following Seminole Tribe.
